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Summary
This thesis provides empirical evidence on two topical health economics-
related issues which are analysed from individual-level data from two developing
countries. Sub Sahara Africa (SSA) is ranked the worst for almost every health
indicator. Regardless of promises of better healthcare by various governments
and donor communities, the region has the highest share of all disease burdens
and millions of people die each year from preventable diseases. Yet, the utilisa-
tion of appropriate healthcare services remains low largely due to the burden of
paying directly from the pocket at the health facilities. Although informal risk-
sharing mechanisms in the form of savings have long existed in many countries
in SSA, the concept of insurance in the health sector is relatively new. Ghana is
among the few countries in the region currently experimenting health insurance
in her health sector.
Ghana’s national health insurance scheme (NHIS) is a fully home-grown
policy that does not receive any external support. After more than ten years
of its implementation, there is a paucity of quantitative study estimating the
impact of the policy on out-of-pocket (OOP) healthcare expenditure; which is
the main objective of the NHIS in Ghana. Therefore the first chapter of this
thesis is focused on estimating the impact of the NHIS on OOP healthcare
expenditure in Ghana. The chapter also looks at the effect of the NHIS on
the use of healthcare services from appropriate health facilities. Aside from the
problem of health expenditures, high levels of morbidity and mortality levels,
there exist weak functioning health systems with high inequality levels in many
countries in the region; making the poor very vulnerable. Nigeria is ranked
among the most unequal countries in the world. Meanwhile, there are some
empirical evidence regarding inequality in various healthcare utilisation and
outcome in the country. Therefore accounting for unobserved heterogeneities
between individuals, the second chapter of this thesis is devoted to investigating
the socio-economic inequality in health hypothesis with evidence from Nigeria.
The analyses carried out in the two papers yield the following conclusions:
in the first paper where Ghana’s health insurance policy is evaluated, the empir-
ical estimation with the entire sample using the full set of explanatory variables
shows a statistically significant negative impact of the NHIS policy on OOP
expenditure on healthcare. This significant impact remains evident in the male
and female sample independently even though the magnitude of the policy im-
pact in the female sample is marginally higher. This means that the NHIS
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is reducing the burden of high healthcare expenditure among the insured in
Ghana. Also, the insured are observed to be more likely to seek healthcare from
appropriate health facilities than their uninsured counterparts.
Then in the second paper; unlike income, using consumption and wealth as
measures of living standard (or socio-economic status (SES)) are found to be
statistically significant in explaining inequality in health status in Nigeria even
after accounting for unobserved heterogeneities. The health status was mea-
sured using the global indicators for activities of daily living (ADLs). However,
there is no empirical evidence with regard to socio-economic inequality in health
expenditures. Finally, decomposing the SES inequality in health status revealed
age, household size, marital status and place of residence to have appreciable
contributions to health status inequalities.
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Introduction
Health economics research has steadily become an important branch of eco-
nomics particularly for developing economies given the role that health plays in
the growth and development process of an economy. In other words, the health
of a population is an indication of the wealth of that nation. It is therefore not
surprising that in comparing the health outcomes of developed countries to their
developing counterparts, the latter is seen to be worse-off in almost all health
indicators making health economics research even more critical in the develop-
ing world. Among the developing economies, Africa which is the poorest region
in terms of per capita income, is also the most challenged in other areas includ-
ing socio-economic and demographic factors. Furthermore, these challenges are
even worse in Sub Sahara Africa (SSA). In addition, the continent is confronted
with a heavy burden of communicable and non-communicable diseases and high
healthcare costs whereby patients are required to pay directly out from their
pockets at the moments when healthcare is needed. Even though a number of
the prevailing challenges can be reduced by the existence of strong institutions
and the political will, many population health difficulties can be eliminated (or
at least be reduced) by investment into research and the willingness on the side
of policy makers to implement findings from these research.
While the focus of many health economics research in the region has been
on issues such as health outcomes (morbidity and mortality levels), healthcare
accessibility and utilisations levels, other aspects of population health such as
healthcare financing and health inequities remain unresolved; thereby creating
some research gap in many developing economies, particularly in SSA. These
are equally important areas that need attention in the literature in terms of
country-specific evidence for a holistic result in the health sector and also for
the development of research in the field. It is therefore not surprising that issues
regarding healthcare financing are among the priority aspects of healthcare for
the World Health Organisation (WHO). This is evident in the 2005 World Health
Assembly resolution which emphasises the point that everyone should be able
to access health services and not be subject to financial hardship (WHO, 2010).
This resolution was made due to the growing reliance of user-fee in the
health sectors of many member countries (especially developing economies) and
the repercussions it had on population health. User-fee in the social sector
(especially education and health), were generally introduced as a cost recovery
measure in many African countries during the early 1980s as a recommendation
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by the World Bank when they sought financial assistance from the Bank. Subse-
quently, the user-fee in the health sector became an important source of revenue
for many African governments. Unfortunately, this method of healthcare financ-
ing resulted in many problems. For example, in Ghana, some of the problems
were delay in reporting to health facilities, low healthcare service utilisation,
partial purchase of prescribed drugs and many needless deaths (Asenso-Okyere,
Anum, Osei-Akoto, and Adukonu, 1998). Therefore as a step to eliminate or
at least minimise the problems associated with the user-fee system by making
healthcare accessible to all at the lowest cost possible, health insurance (HI) has
become a globally accepted means of financing healthcare expenditures. Unlike
the developed world, in Africa, this cost sharing strategy in the health sector is
a relatively new phenomenon. African countries such as Democratic Republic of
Congo, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal and South Africa, are currently experimenting
the health insurance scheme as an alternative to provide affordable health to
the population but the coverage has been relatively low due to health systems
weaknesses (Kirigia and Barry, 2008). In other words, in the developing world,
health insurance implementing countries are at different stages in the implemen-
tation process. For instance, Ghana, Indonesia, The Philippines, Rwanda and
Vietnam are considered to be in their intermediate stage of HI reform; while
others such as Kenya, India, Mali and Nigeria are at the very early stage of
the implementation process (Lagomarsino, Garabrant, Adyas, Muga, and Otoo,
2012).
Even though insurance in the health sector is relatively far advanced in the
developed world, it remains a topical issue. Some of the recent issues that have
generated research and discussions on various platforms in these countries relate
to the sustainability of healthcare funds and how to encourage the uninsured
(especially those in the informal sector) to enrol. Nevertheless these are also
potential problems (if not existing) in the developing world too. The United
States for instance has undertaken tax reforms to extend tax incentive for health
insurance in order to encourage people in the informal sector to enrol (Gruber
and Poterba, 1994); even though the effectiveness of this strategy, just like any
other normal good largely depends on the elasticity of demand for the health
insurance.
Meanwhile, health systems differ from country to country and the existing
healthcare systems may be an indication of the norms and values prevailing in
that particular country. Traditionally, based on the source of financing, there
are three types of health insurance models namely; Beveridge model, Bismarck
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model and Private insurance model (Lameire, Joffe, and Wiedemann, 1999).
The Beveridge insurance model is a system run by the state whereby universal
access to health care (preventive and curative treatments) is financed mainly
from general taxation (O’Connell, 2012). Here, health care budget competes
with other spending priorities and health services are mainly provided by public
providers. Aside from the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, Denmark, Finland,
Italy, Spain and Sweden are also known for implementing this type of health
insurance. The Bismark model on the other hand is an insurance-based but
run by the government which requires mandatory enrolment for the entire pop-
ulation and financed through progressive contributions based solely on income.
Under this model, healthcare services may be provided by both public and pri-
vate providers and allows more flexible spending on healthcare (Lameire et al.,
1999). Notable examples of countries implementing this model are Austria, Ger-
many, France and Switzerland. The third, Private health insurance operates in
a form of contract between the insurance company and the clientele` based on
an insurance premium for a given benefit coverage. Obviously, majority of the
providers here belong to the private sector. For a pure private health insurance,
a classic example of implementing country is the United States. In the develop-
ing world, countries with reasonable private providers include inter alia Brazil,
Chile, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.
Although this kind of private risk-sharing in health is a relatively new phe-
nomenon in many low and middle-income countries, there seem to be an in-
creasing trend with a greater proportion happening in Asia and Eastern Europe.
Not surprising, SSA lags behind in this regard and this has been attributed to
the prevailing low per capita income and weak institutional structures. Yet in
Africa, South Africa and Morocco are the countries known to have a sizeable
private insurance industry (Drechsler and Jutting, 2007). In terms of which
health insurance model is the best, there is no direct answer. The Bismarck
model appears to be relatively more appealing in welfare economics because of
its equity consideration which is based on the ability-to-pay principle. However,
regards issues on fund sustainability, the Beveridge model seems to be a better
option.
Now, since the issue of universal health coverage received substantial at-
tention in low income countries, attempts have been made to create various
risk-pooling groups; hence the establishment of community-based health insur-
ance (CBHI) scheme in some of these countries. The CBHI is made up of smaller
risk-sharing groups (usually residents in a community) and premiums are rela-
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tively moderate compared to the private health insurance model. This also has
an advantage of adapting to the needs of subscribers (Drechsler and Jutting,
2007). Democratic Republic of Congo, Senegal and Rwanda are notable exam-
ples of countries implementing the community-based health insurance strategy
(Spaan, Mathijssen, Tromp, McBain, Have, and Baltussen, 2012). By defining
the benefit package of HI based on the the general health needs of members, the
design and implementation of health insurance schemes typically in developing
countries vary among countries, reflecting peculiar country characteristic(s). For
example, in analysing the health insurance systems in nine (9) low and lower-
middle income countries1 in Africa and Asia, Lagomarsino et al. (2012) found
varying health insurance models among these countries and these models also
did not strictly conform to the historical archetypes.2 Nonetheless many health
insurance schemes in developing countries are largely financed through tax rev-
enues. An exception is in Rwanda where close to half (47 percent) of HI funding
comes from donor support (Lagomarsino et al., 2012).3 However, the benefit
package and targeted population are among some of the features distinguishing
the various HI schemes. For instance, the benefit package of Ghana’s national
health insurance scheme (NHIS) is based on the country’s disease profile and
thereby does not include certain life-style diseases (e.g. obesity, kidney-related
issues, etc.), sickling cell diseases, cosmetic and beautification surgery. While
Ghana’s NHIS scheme has the entire population as its ultimate target, India’s
Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojna4 and Vietnam’s health care fund for the poor
are designed mainly to provide free healthcare for the poor (see. Wagstaff, 2009;
Lagomarsino et al., 2012).5 Hence the success or otherwise of any health in-
surance programme is dependent on many factors such as the prevailing health
systems, cultural and religious beliefs of the people it serves.
The growing demand for the expansion of health insurance globally as a
means to move closer to attaining universal health coverage necessitates proper
evaluation of the policy that takes into account the varying economic and demo-
graphic characteristics of implementing countries. Therefore the first chapter
of this thesis provides an empirical evidence regards how Ghana’s health insur-
1The countries include Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, The Philippines,
Rwanda and Vietnam.
2i.e. Beveridge, Bismarck or Private models
3Yet in Kenya and Mali, donor funding accounts for at least a quarter of HI funding; i.e.
36 and 27 percent respectively.
4i.e. the national health insurance in India
5However, India’s Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojna has been extended to include other
vulnerable groups such as street vendors and domestic workers (Lagomarsino et al., 2012).
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ance scheme is impacting on out-of-pocket expenditure on healthcare and the
utilisation of healthcare services from appropriate health facilities.
As earlier indicated, inequality in health is another population health issue
which needs more attention in the literature as far as health in SSA is con-
cerned. Yet, much of the discussions over the rising level of inequality is with
respect to total or some components (e.g. wage rates, earnings, remittances)
of income inequality. Relating this to health, considerable effort (though not
enough) has been devoted to the socio-economic status (SES) and health in-
equality hypothesis in the literature but existing empirical evidence seem to
suggest that this debate is far from being settled. Again, as mentioned al-
ready, countries differ in terms of their healthcare systems and factors that
influence their living standards. Empirical studies that support the SES and
health inequality hypothesis have provided evidence to argue that health6 is
affected by the distribution of socio-economic status within an economy (see for
example: Ben-Shlomo, White, and Marmot, 1996; Kaplan, Pamuk, Lynch, Co-
hen, and Balfour, 1996; Kawachi and Kennedy, 1997; Kennedy, Kawachi, Glass,
and Prothrow-Stith, 1998; Shibuya, Hashimoto, and Yano, 2002; Wagstaff, van
Doorslaer, and Watanaba, 2003; Wagstaff, 2005). While there is an extensive
empirical evidence from the developed world, the same cannot be said for the
developing world. Unfortunately in the developing world, factors such as cul-
ture and religion also play key roles in influencing the beliefs and choices made
by the people which may eventually affect their living standards. Therefore,
the effect of socio-economic status on health may be country-specific and prob-
ably contribute to reasons why the debate is still far from conclusion. Studies
on socio-economic status and health inequality hypothesis vary in a number of
ways and hence making this hypothesis a controversial one.
Firstly, many empirical studies investigating the SES and health inequal-
ity relationship have been conducted at various levels of aggregation; including
population, community/states and individual levels; with quite contrasting rev-
elations. For example, there are studies at the population level of aggregation7
that suggest an inconclusive evidence (see Rodgers, 1979; Waldmann, 1992;
Bidani and Ravallion, 1997; Beckfield, 2004). Here, while income inequality is
found to have an important effect on health (Rodgers, 1979; Waldmann, 1992),
in other studies, income inequality no longer mattered in the health of the
6of an individual and/or population
7whereby the effect of SES inequality on health is investigated using the population health
and SES indicators.
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poor (Bidani and Ravallion, 1997; Beckfield, 2004). In addition, other empiri-
cal evidence have shown that studies carried out at the aggregate level may be
associated with aggregation-related problems8 and may therefore lead to biased
estimates (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2000; Gravelle, Wildman, and Sutton,
2002; Mellor and Milyo, 2002). Meanwhile, a number of community level studies
(such as: Ben-Shlomo et al., 1996; Kaplan et al., 1996; Kawachi and Kennedy,
1997; Kennedy, Kawachi, and Prothrow-Stith, 1996a; Lynch, Kaplan, Pamuk,
Cohen, and K.E. Heck, 1998); focusing on the within-country relationship have
confirmed the existence of some correlation between SES inequality and health.
However, in Kennedy et al. (1998), the evidence of SES inequality in health is
mixed such that the association between income and health inequality dimin-
ishes as one goes further up on the income distribution9. Then at the individual
level of aggregation, again the findings are mixed. That is, while there are stud-
ies supporting the SES inequality in health hypothesis (Kennedy et al., 1998;
Shibuya et al., 2002; Wagstaff et al., 2003; Wagstaff, 2005; Lindelow, 2006),
others empirical studies find no consistent association between socio-economic
inequality and health inequality (Daly, Duncan, Kaplan, and Lynch, 1998; Fis-
cella and Franks, 1997; Mellor and Milyo, 2002; Osler, Prescott, Gronbaek,
Christensen, Due, and Engholm, 2002; Sturm and Gresenz, 2002).
Secondly, significant number of these studies have relied on income as a mea-
sure of living standard10 (see for example: Daly et al., 1998; Fiscella and Franks,
1997; Gravelle et al., 2002; Kennedy et al., 1998; Osler et al., 2002; Shibuya
et al., 2002; Sturm and Gresenz, 2002; Wildman, 2003b); suggesting health is
directly affected by income inequality. However for developing countries (such
as Nigeria), consumption is argued to be a better measure of living standard
since it captures what households consumed whether they purchased, produced
or financed it through current, future or past income (Deaton and Grosh, 2000).
Also, because many households are engaged in subsistence agriculture making
home production an important component of household consumption, consump-
tion level is argued to be a better approximation of households’ standard of living
in the developing world (O’Donnell, Doorslaer, Wagstaff, and Lindelow, 2008).
In addition, consumption may be different from income in instances where con-
sumers borrow or save, or receives transfers from other family members or as
in-kind payments from employers or from the government as part of government
8especially when dealing with non-linear functions
9This effect is even no more at the top of the income distribution.
10probably because of data constraints
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social protection programme.
Thirdly, reliance on cross-sectional data for such analysis and(or) failure
to control for other covariates are(is) very common among a lot of the existing
studies (see: Kennedy et al., 1998; Lindelow, 2006; Shibuya et al., 2002; Wagstaff
and Watanabe, 2003). Ability to control for the influence of unobserved differ-
ences among respondents in regression models is critical for estimating unbiased
outcome(s). Certainly, studies that rely on only a cross-sectional data will be
unable to account for such unobserved heterogeneities between countries or in-
dividual and hence may produce biased estimates. A possible solution to this
problem is to use fixed effect regression model but only a few have done so
(examples include: Daly et al., 1998; Mellor and Milyo, 2002; Beckfield, 2004).
Fourthly, in estimating the SES health inequality, conventional measures
such as the Gini coefficient (Judge, 1995; Kennedy et al., 1998; Gravelle et al.,
2002; Shibuya et al., 2002; Mellor and Milyo, 2002), income shares (Daly et al.,
1998; Fiscella and Franks, 1997; Sturm and Gresenz, 2002), coefficient of varia-
tion (Soobader and LeClere, 1999), and Robin Hood index (Kennedy, Kawachi,
and Prothrow-Stith, 1996b) which are insensitive to the socio-economic dimen-
sion to inequalities in health are frequently used. For example the use of coeffi-
cient of variation by Kennedy et al. (1996b) revealed only the inequality in the
health variable and not the SES-related health inequality. Taking into account
this deficiency, the analysis carried out in this study uses health concentration
indices. The concentration index has an additional advantage of accounting for
this dimension of inequality ignored by other measures of inequality.
Finally, the main focus of many empirical studies on this relationship partic-
ularly in the developing world has been restricted to maternal and child health11
(see: Wagstaff, 2000, 2005; Wagstaff et al., 2003; Wagstaff and Watanabe, 2003).
A probable reason for this trend may be attributed to data constraints and
thereby creating a research gap regards other aspects of health and health-
related behaviours such as the functional capabilities of an individual and health
expenditure which are among the health-related variables considered in the sec-
ond chapter of this thesis.
Inequality is increasingly becoming a matter of concern in Nigeria (UNDP,
2009). Despite being one of the world’s leading exporters of oil, the country is
ranked 47th (Factbook) in terms of inequality with a Gini index of about 0.4412;
11mainly mortality levels and maternal healthcare services (i.e. antenatal care, institutional
deliveries, etc.)
12The Gini index is according to The World Bank’s world development indicators (WDI)
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placing Nigeria among the most unequal countries in the world. The income
shares held by the highest 20 and 10 percent of the population in 2009 were
estimated to be 49 and 33 percentages respectively. Meanwhile, the income share
for the lowest 10 percent of the population was just about 2 percent. In addition,
about 53.47 percent of the population were estimated as poor using the poverty
headcount ratio of USD 1.90 per day.13 The high poverty problem is suggested
to be a characteristic of the high inequality level prevailing in the country and
this systematic structure of inequity may among other things imply limited
opportunities and low purchasing power (UNDP, 2009); which may include
expenditure on healthcare services. Consequently, there are great disparities in
health status even though some health indicators have shown steady, albeit slow
improvement (WHO, 2014).
Comparing Nigeria’s health indicators to those of other countries within the
same income group (lower-middle income status) shows that the country is far
behind. For instance, the life expectancy at birth in Nigeria which was about
52.74 years in 2014; was lower than that of the group’s average of 67.15 years,
or other lower-middle income countries such as; Ghana (61.31 years), Kenya
(61.58 years), India (68.01 years), Morocco (74.02 years) and Vietnam (75.63
years) during the same period. Meanwhile, healthcare expenditure remains
high in Nigeria with private healthcare expenditure (as a percentage of gross
domestic product (GDP)) estimated at 2.75 (in 2014). The health indicators
within the country also vary greatly with the northern part of the country
being worse-off. Currently, there is no well functioning health insurance system
making patients bear almost all healthcare expenditure. That is, out-of-pocket
(OOP) healthcare expenditure is estimated at 95.74 percent14 representing a
huge burden on an average Nigerian. Given the prevailing high inequality level,
the burden of OOP healthcare expenditure, generally low health status and the
associated differences in these health indicators within the country, the second
chapter of the thesis is interested in estimating the SES inequality in health by
finding out if the variation in socio-economic status (measured independently by
consumption, income and wealth levels) affects inequality in health status and
health expenditures in Nigeria after accounting for unobserved heterogeneity.
By carrying out this analysis, the study provides an empirical evidence as
to whether or not the socio-economic inequality in health hypothesis holds for
health status (measured by the functional capabilities of an individual) and
13This is with respect to 2011 purchasing power parity. All estimates are according to WDI.
14Figures sourced from WDI.
14
health expenditures after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Also, the use
of three (3) different measures of socio-economic status (consumption, income
and wealth) independently in the analysis has an advantage of estimating and
presenting the socio-economic inequality in health completely from different
angles and judgements. The analysis further looks at how the factors vary in
terms of their contribution to socio-economic health inequality.
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Chapter 1
The Impact of National
Health Insurance Scheme
on Out-of-Pocket
Healthcare Expenditure
and Facility Utilisation in
Ghana
16
Abstract
The concept of health insurance (HI) is relatively new in the developing world. Meanwhile
among countries experimenting HI, there is a dearth of empirical studies regarding the impact
of the HI scheme on healthcare expenditure, particularly in Sub Saharan African (SSA). This
study provides an insight into how Ghana is using her health insurance scheme; the country’s
major social protection programme, to impact out-of-pocket (OOP) healthcare expenditure
and facility utilisation. The policy impact is estimated by using difference-in-difference (DID)
estimation strategy. The analysis also takes into account self selection into the HI programme
by using propensity score matching to create a comparable control group. The use of DID
estimation means that the impact estimated here relates to the effect of the HI only on those
covered by the scheme (average treatment effect on the treated). Generally the results in
the full set model show that the HI scheme is serving as a cushion against the burden of
OOP healthcare expenditure in Ghana. Meanwhile, the outcome by gender indicates that the
magnitude of the benefits derived from the scheme is only marginally higher in the female
sample. Finally, the insured are found to be more likely to seek healthcare from appropriate
heath facilities than their uninsured counterparts. Given that the HI scheme is criticised for its
piece-meal implementation, to achieve improvements in the health of all, the findings in this
chapter is an indication for policy makers to introduce some form of incentives to encourage
those in the informal sector to enrol.
Keywords: health insurance, healthcare expenditure, utilisation, Ghana
JEL: I13
1.1 Introduction
Although informal risk-sharing mechanisms in the form of savings have long ex-
isted in many developing countries including Ghana, the concept of risk-sharing
in the health sector is a relatively new phenomenon in many of these countries.
Out-of-pocket (OOP) payments remain the main source of healthcare financing
in many low and middle-income countries, making the utilisation of appropriate
healthcare services generally low in these countries. Meanwhile the promotion
and protection of health is regarded essential to human welfare and the suste-
nance of economic and social development (WHO, 2010). As a result, health
continues to be a major political concern as governments strive to meet the
demands and expectations of their people. For instance, African leaders recog-
nised that though the prevailing healthcare systems on the continent needed
some external help, such assistance could only be achieved if the leaders them-
selves demonstrated some form of commitment. Therefore, during an annual
meeting of African Union (AU) heads of States in Abuja-Nigeria, 2001, African
leaders/governments pledged to allocate at least 15 percent of their respective
annual budget to the improvement of their health sectors. Unfortunately, many
African countries1 had not been able to fulfil this pledge as at the end of 2013.
Those who have managed to achieve this target have also not been consistent.2
In Ghana, the target was achieved only in 2005, 2007 and 2009 (WHO, 2016).3
More than a decade into this resolution, over-reliance on out-of-pocket (OOP)
payment for healthcare continues to be an impediment to a more rapid move-
ment toward universal health coverage (UHC) in developing countries partic-
ularly Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Therefore, patients are required
to make payments (either in full or part) at the moments when healthcare is
needed. Ghana is no exception regards the burden of OOP expenditure on the
utilisation of healthcare services. The out-of-pocket expenditure on healthcare
in Ghana, as a percentage of total health expenditure between 1995 and 2013
have witnessed fluctuating trends and remains an important determinant of
healthcare services utilisation. This averaged about 30 percent between 1995
and 20044; and then recorded some marginal declines until 2012. In 2013, the
1Such as Angola, Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire and Mali.
2Examples include Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Ghana and
Mali. It is worth noting that the government of Mali has shown tremendous commitment such
that in 2012, the government’s share to the health sector as a percentage of total government
expenditure was 22.1 percent (WHO, 2016).
3These were 15.1, 16.2 and 16.4 percentages respectively.
4Just before the implementation of the National Health Insurance Scheme in Ghana in
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country recorded the highest percentage (36.2) for OOP expenditure on health.
Expressing OOP as a percentage of private health expenditure, households in
Ghana not only bear more than half of the entire cost but also, the figure has
been increasing over the period. For instance in 1995, this was estimated at
64.2 percent but in 2014, the figure had increased to 66.8 percent. Although
when comparing Ghana’s rates to those of her immediate neighbouring countries
(Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire and Togo), they are relatively low for Ghana, these
countries have rather been improving given that they witnessed declining trends
in their OOP health expenditures within the same period.5 Again, Ghana’s rate
of 66.8 percent in 2014 was far above both the World’s average (45.5 percent)
and OECD members’ average (36.0 percent) within the same period.6
Globally, as part of measures to reduce (or eliminate) the burden of financ-
ing healthcare directly from the pocket, health insurance (HI) has emerged as a
promising alternative. Health insurance may be financed by the state through
general taxation; insurance-based run by the state; or through private contract
between the insurance company and the cliente`le based on insurance premium
for a given benefit coverage (O’Connell, 2012; Lameire et al., 1999). Regardless
of the financing strategy, HI may be implemented for various reasons including
inter alia; to increase utilisation of appropriate healthcare services, reduce in-
cidence of self-medication,7 reduce OOP expenditure on healthcare, minimise
delays in reporting to health facility when sick/injured, improve social inclusion
and generally to improve the health status of the population it serves. De-
spite the general impression that HI should increases the utilisation of health-
care services, health insurance can lead to an improvement in health status
and thereby reduce the need and use of healthcare services (Taubman, Allen,
Wright, Baicker, and Finkelstein, 2014). However, such an effect may probably
happen in the long term. Meanwhile, among the reasons outlined earlier, the
primary objectives of any HI model are to reduce OOP health expenditure and
increase utilisation of appropriate healthcare services.
Just like many goods and services, it is expected that removing the difficulties
in accessibility may lead to “abuse” of the service (that is the moral hazard
component associated with the provision of free or subsidised good or service).
2005.
5That is, these countries recorded the following: Burkina Faso (94.3 percent), Cote d’Ivoire
(81.6 percent) and Togo (83.5 percent) in 1995. However, by 2014 these rates declined signif-
icantly to 81.9, 719 and 75.1 percentages respectively.
6Figures were sourced from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.OOP.ZS
7Which is very common in developing economies.
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But healthcare services appear to be quite unique since patients bear some
form of pain/burden or in the worse case, may lose their lives in the case of any
hidden action. Therefore, individuals are likely to take good care of themselves
and rather visit a health facility when the need arises. Even in instances of
increased healthcare service utilisation after health insurance, Wagstaff (2009)
indicates that part of the increase in utilisation is a form of risk-pooling whereby
resources are rather transferred from those “fortunate” not to have fallen sick
to their “unfortunate” counterparts who fell sick and this represents a welfare
gain from insurance.
Although HI has been successful in many countries, such successes largely
depend on prevailing health systems and the group it serves.8 Empirically,
there is evidence that HI provides financial protection by reducing the burden
of OOP healthcare expenditure; and thereby improving health service utilisation
(see. Xu, Evans, Kawabata, Zeramdini, Klavus, and Murray, 2003; Chaudhuri
and Roy, 2008; Spaan et al., 2012; Wagstaff, 2009; Brugiavini and Pace, 2011;
Blanchet, Fink, and Osei-Akoto, 2012). However, according to Spaan et al.
(2012), there is rather a weak evidence of HI providing financial sustainability
in countries like Rwanda and Uganda; and there is also an insufficient evidence
of HI improving social inclusion.9
In Ghana, the national health insurance scheme (NHIS) was implemented
in 2005 mainly as a strategy to remove financial barriers to healthcare service
utilisation. Although the intention is to eventually make the NHIS free to
everyone, currently, the scheme is highly subsidised for formal sector employees.
The policy was received with much enthusiasm when it was first introduced.
This was evident in the very long queues in NHIS-accredited health facilities.
Unfortunately, in recent times, there has been mixed feelings and the enthusiasm
appears to have come down. A number of concerns have also been raised both
by patients and the service providers with some facilities threatening to decline
the provision of the service package to beneficiaries. One of such complaints
regards delay10 in NHIS reimbursement to service providers. This according to
many service providers puts unnecessary pressures on them in terms of how to
raise funds to run the day-to-day activities of the facilities. Therefore in some
8That is, in instances where HI is implemented on a piece-meal basis.
9With respect to social inclusion, it was revealed that while HI increased the number of
insured indigents in The Philippines and The Thai, the poor in Cameroon, Guinea and Senegal
were mostly not enrolled because of the premium charged (Spaan et al., 2012). See Spaan
et al. (2012) who extensively reviewed existing studies on the impact of HI.
10Sometimes as far back as 9 to 13 months of unpaid funds.
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facilities, even when the prescribed drugs are available, patients are requested to
pay because they are told those drugs are not available in the facility’s pharmacy.
There is also the issue of co-payments (although illegal) existing in some health
facilities.
Evaluating the impact of the NHIS is useful because despite being credited as
one of the few developing countries that achieved the millennium development
goal one (MDG 1)11 even before the set 2015 deadline, the health-related MDGs
(goals 4, 5 and 6) were not even achieved at the end of 2015. In addition, Ghana’s
life expectancy at birth of 61 years (2013) is not very impressive compared to the
likes of other lower-middle-income12 countries such as Cape Verde (73 years),
Egypt (71 years), Morocco (74 years), Bangladesh (71 years) and India (68
years) during the same period. Given that OOP expenditure on healthcare
is still high and life expectancy at birth is relatively low in Ghana, there is
obviously the need to evaluate the impact of Ghana’s NHIS policy on OOP
healthcare expenditure after a decade of its implementation.
Another reason for this study is the fact that the NHIS is currently the only
major social protection programme implemented by the government of Ghana.
The programme does not receive any sponsorship from the Donor Community.
Therefore, being a fully home-grown policy, there is a considerable interest in
estimating the impact of the policy on health expenditure13 since not much has
been done in this regard. Then also, prior to the implementation of the NHIS,
the healthcare financing system that existed required patients to make part-
payment even before healthcare was received. This discouraged many Ghana-
ians from seeking appropriate healthcare; with some resorting to self medication
or cheap and unsafe tradition methods. Therefore, the paper asks the following
questions; has the health insurance scheme in Ghana reduced OOP healthcare
expenditure and by how much? is there any variation in the policy impact by
gender? and does being enrolled under the scheme influence the utilisation of
healthcare services from appropriate health facilities in Ghana?
The study’s main objective shares a similarity with that by Brugiavini and
Pace (2016), but the focus and the methodology adopted in this study are
very different. Here in this study, the analyses are carried out by first using
11MDG 1 was to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger and Ghana achieved this in 2006.
12Ghana attained a lower-middle-income status in 2010 with her gross domestic product and
gross national income per capita at market prices estimated at USD 38.62 billion and USD
1,590 respectively in 2014 (both values are in current US dollars). The values were sourced
from WDI’s data.worldbank.org/country/ghana.
13which is the main objective of the policy
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propensity score matching to account for some observable characteristics that
may bias the study’s outcome. Secondly, unlike Brugiavini and Pace (2016)
who used a probit model that to some extent accounts for self selection into the
health insurance enrolment, this study uses difference-in-difference estimation
strategy to account for unobserved heterogeneity that may bias the results.14
Thirdly, aside from estimating the policy impact for the entire sample, this
study introduces a gender perspective in the analysis by also estimating the
policy impact in the male and female samples independently. That is, for an
informative analysis of the health insurance policy impact, there is the need to
divide the sample into groups that provide meaningful implications. The gender-
perspective analysis carried out in this study is worthy for three main reasons.
Firstly, it provides a relatively more detailed information on the contribution
made by the NHIS policy to respondents’ budgetary allocation particularly to
healthcare given that estimating the policy impact in the entire sample may
mask certain details that may be driven by gender disparities. Secondly and
most importantly, although family, lifestyles, social and cultural factors play
significant roles in the health of an individual, biologically, men and women
have different health needs that may require varying degree of healthcare ser-
vice utilisation and hence the implication(s) on their healthcare expenditure.
For instance, compared to males, the reproductive stage (15 - 49 years) of fe-
males is associated with many health risks which may influence their healthcare
decisions. Finally, in certain parts of the country, particularly in the north,
women’s involvement in decision making is very limited. That is men are re-
garded as superior in the household and therefore are required to make all
decisions concerning running the household and the welfare of all its members,
thereby restricting women autonomy and their access to certain services such
as healthcare. Therefore, the gender-perspective analysis is expected to unravel
the extent to which men and women are taking advantage of the HI policy and
the impact (if any) on their out-of-pocket health expenditures. This is undoubt-
edly a vital contribution to the empirical evidence on the health insurance policy
impact in Ghana and to the literature at large.
The final distinction lies in the choice of dataset used in the analysis. While
the study by Brugiavini and Pace (2016) was conducted using a cross-section
data from the 2013 Ghana Demographic and Health Survey (GDHS), this study
uses two repeated cross-section datasets from the Ghana Living Standard Sur-
14The study by Brugiavini and Pace (2016) was an only an extensive margin analysis.
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vey which provide before and after policy implementation information of respon-
dents needed to carry out the difference-in-difference estimations. The datasets
are extensively described later in the chapter.
Carrying out this study is very important both from Ghanaian and interna-
tional perspectives. From a Ghanaian perspective, the NHIS was introduced to
provide free health insurance coverage for workers and to reduce the burden of
OOP healthcare expenditure in Ghana. A reduction in household or individual
budget on healthcare will ensure that they have enough disposable income to
consume other equally important goods and services. Also, the health insurance
in Ghana was a major political campaign tool in the run-down to the 2000 gen-
eral elections by the then main opposition political party (New Patriotic Party)
because of the existing financial hardship in accessing healthcare and Ghanaians
waited anxiously for it when the party gained political power in 2001. Since its
implementation in 2005, not much has been done with regard to the quantitative
impact of the policy on out-of-pocket healthcare expenditure. That is, many
of the existing empirical studies have either been qualitative in nature; or used
data on selected parts of the country.
In addition, these have primarily focused on enrolment levels, healthcare ser-
vices provided, utilisation and patient satisfaction; and willingness and accept-
ability of the policy (see. Asenso-Okyere, Osei-Akoto, Anum, and Appiah, 1997;
Jehu-Appiah, Aryeetey, Spaan, Hoop, Agyepong, and Baltussen, 2011; Dalin-
jong and Laar, 2012; Brugiavini and Pace, 2011, 2016). The use of area/district-
specific data for such analysis makes the analysis not nationally representative
and so outcomes cannot be generalised. In this study, a nationally representa-
tive household survey data which contain a wide range of information is used in
the analysis. Finally, unlike other social protection programmes in the past, the
NHIS is a home-grown insurance which is modelled based on the country’s socio-
economic characteristics with no funding from external sources (Seddoh, Adjei,
and Nazzar, 2011). In fact, the NHIS is the only social protection programme
the country currently can boast of; making it necessary for an evaluation to find
out the extent to which Ghanaians are benefiting from the scheme in order to
make some policy recommendations.
From an international perspective, Africa (especially SSA) is far behind in
terms of the WHO’s universal health coverage (UHC) agenda. Also, there is
heterogeneity among health insurance implementing countries in terms of the
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design15 of insurance, targeted groups,16 benefits package, disease profile, and
the preferences and expectations of the people it serves. For instance, with
respect to the targeted group, while Vietnam’s healthcare fund for the poor is
specifically designed to cover the poor and those living in vulnerable communi-
ties (Wagstaff, 2009); Ghana’s NHIS appears to be pro-rich (see. Jehu-Appiah
et al., 2011; Brugiavini and Pace, 2016) given that the formal sector employ-
ees whose healthcare expenditures are highly subsidised under the scheme are
rather relatively better-off economically. The differing characteristics in relation
to the prevailing health systems necessitate country-specific study to find out
the impact of the policy on intended objectives. Furthermore, this study pro-
vides an insight into the extent to which Ghana is using her home-grown health
insurance scheme to reduce financial barrier(s) to healthcare service utilisation.
This may help institutions like the WHO and UNICEF on how to apply the
findings from this study to other areas of healthcare to guide country program-
ming in support for the universal health coverage agenda. Finally, this study is
also a contribution to the empirical evidence on the impact of health insurance
on healthcare expenditure and utilisation of healthcare services from appropri-
ate health facilities such that the findings may be useful for other countries
that share Ghana’s characteristics and with the intention of introducing health
insurance to their heath sector.
The rest of the paper is organised in the following manner: section 1.2 pro-
vides an overview of the health systems that have existed in Ghana right from
independence to the current national health insurance scheme (NHIS). The sec-
tion also highlights some of the problems that prevailed in Ghana’s health sys-
tem prior to the implementation of the NHIS in the country. This is followed by
the empirical model and other related issues in treatment evaluation literature
in section 1.3. In section 1.4, the data and the description of variables used
in the estimation are presented. The results and discussions are subsequently
presented in section 1.5 and the final section concludes the chapter.
1.2 Ghana’s healthcare system
Beginning from independence17 until the mid-1970s, there was “free universal
healthcare” policy in Ghana. Unfortunately, the period between 1966 and 1981
15This includes both the institutional design and the organisational models.
16Particularly in countries where the policy does not cover the entire population.
17Ghana obtained political independence from the British on 6th March, 1957.
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witnessed significant political instability mainly in the form of series of coup
d’etat which led to frequent change of governments and inadequate investment
in healthcare by successive governments. Generally, the early 1980s were very
challenging moments for many SSA countries and most sought help from in-
ternational and multinational institutions particularly the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF); and Ghana was no exception, hence the
introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme(SAP) in Ghana around
the same period. An important aspect of the SAP was the introduction of cost
recovery measures in the social sectors (particularly education and health) in
the form of user charges or fees (Asenso-Okyere et al., 1998).
The introduction of the “user fee” or “fee-for-service” system in 1985 re-
quired Ghanaians to pay for their healthcare to enable cost recovery for the
health sector. Patients were therefore required to pay partly for consultations
and diagnostic procedures, and fully for drugs supplied (Asenso-Okyere et al.,
1998). Later in 1992, the government of Ghana introduced the “cash and carry”
system where patients were still required to pay for consultations and diagnostic
procedures and fully for drugs supplied. With this system, patients’ first point
of contact in a health facility was the revenue collection point of the outpatient
department (OPD). The “cash and carry” system led to delay in reporting to
health facilities, partial purchase of prescribed drugs and sharing of prescribed
drugs with other household members. In some instances, when more than one
person in a household was sick, only one member visited a health facility, took
the prescribed drugs and shared with other sick members in order to avoid
multiple payments of consultations and diagnostic fees (Asenso-Okyere et al.,
1998).
The “cash and carry” system resulted in many needless deaths and hence in
2003, the government of Ghana instituted the national health insurance scheme
(NHIS); which was established by the National Health Insurance Act 2003 (Act
650) to provide financial access to quality basic healthcare for residents in Ghana
but this was fully implemented in 2005. Even though on paper, there are three
types of schemes under the NHIS Law,18 only the District-Wide Mutual Health
Insurance Scheme (DMHIS) is operative because of the support it receives from
the government. Under the DMHIS, each district is divided into health insur-
ance communities so that health insurance is brought to the door-step of all.
The government uses the NHIS as a source of social protection for the people of
18The types of scheme are: District-Wide Mutual Health Insurance Scheme, Private Mutual
Health Insurance Scheme and Private Commercial Health Insurance Scheme.
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Ghana. The responsibility for managing the Scheme is assigned to a Council,
who reports to the Minister for Health; who subsequently serves as a channel
of communication with the President for executive decisions and Parliament
for budgetary and legislative decisions regards running of the Scheme (Seddoh
et al., 2011).
Eligibility for membership requires an annual premium of GHC 16 (about
USD 5.00) and an enrolment fee of GHC 1.50 (USD 0.50). Although the scheme
is designed to eventually cover the entire population, an important feature of
the NHIS is its piece-meal implementation whereby, the following category of
people are exempted from paying any premium; contributors of Social Security
National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) or those drawing pension on SSNIT, persons
less than 18 years (provided both parents are enrolled or covered by the ex-
emption clause), persons 70 years old and beyond and indigents. The exempted
groups are required to pay only the enrolment fee which is a one-time payment.
Membership is transferable across districts so that a person automatically be-
comes a member of the resident Scheme any time (s)he relocates.
Following from Ghana’s New Pensions Act in 2010, the SSNIT contribution
is 18 percent in total of the monthly salary of workers. Of this, 13.5 percent is
paid by the employer and 5 percent by the worker. From the 13.5 percent paid
by the employer, 2.5 percent goes into the National Health Insurance Fund. It
is important to note that all benefits associated with being a member of SSNIT
prior to the introduction of the national health insurance scheme have remained
unchanged. This means that for formal sector employees, the NHIS is a policy
to help subsidise their healthcare expenditures. Other major sources of funds for
the National Health Insurance Fund are through 2.5 percentage points of value
added tax (VAT), and voluntary National Health Insurance Levy (NHIL) which
mainly covers the informal sector workers (NHIA, 2012). As earlier indicated,
for the formal sector employees (SSNIT contributors), they are classified under
the exemption clause so that they only pay a one-time enrolment fee at the
Scheme’s offices for their identity cards to be issued.
The National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) directly reimburses the
NHIS-accredited health facilities for the cost incurred in providing free health-
care to the beneficiaries. The NHIS-accredited facilities include all public health
facilities at all levels and some selected private and mission based health facili-
ties. This means that these beneficiaries are not required to pay deposits or any
form of co-payments at the NHIS-accredited health facilities whenever they seek
care. Unlike the formal sector employees with SSNIT, the NHIS is voluntary for
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the informal sector employees since they are required to pay both the premium
and the enrolment fee before they can benefit from the service package which
covers at least 90 percent of the disease burden in Ghana.19
As noted earlier, the health insurance in Ghana is being implemented on
a piece-meal20 basis with formal sector employees currently benefiting greatly.
The reasons to deduct formal sector workers’ contribution from their social
security deduction instead of the their salary earnings is to provide free health
insurance coverage for workers within minimum benefit package, minimise the
proportion of healthcare expenditure of their household budget so that they
have enough disposable income during their working days and when they go
on retirement (NHIA, 2012). The fact that formal sector employees are highly
subsided under the health insurance scheme does not mean people can easily
switch jobs and work in the formal sector. The informal sector employs over 70
percent of the Ghanaian working population given that it’s relatively easier to
find work there. As at the end of 2012, the NHIS covered about 35 percent of the
population in Ghana (NHIA, 2012). Although the country has recorded some
improvements in her health indicators,21 the scheme has had some challenges;
of which some of them have been noted earlier in the chapter.
Now, given Ghana’s national health insurance scheme (NHIS) and the fact
that the major objective of the policy is to reduce the burden of paying directly
from one’s pocket at the point when healthcare is needed, this study asks the fol-
lowing questions: has the NHIS reduced out-of-pocket healthcare expenditure;
does the impact of the NHIS on OOP healthcare expenditure differ by gender;
and does being enrolled under the scheme influence the utilisation of services
from appropriate healthcare facilities? Providing empirical answers to these
questions is expected to be very useful particularly for policy makers since over
a decade of the scheme’s implementation, not much has been done empirically
regarding the scheme’s major objective of reducing out-of-pocket expenditure
on healthcare.
19The benefit package does not include family planning commodities, beautification surgery
and some chronic and long-term illness such as kidney-related problems (Seddoh et al., 2011).
20This may be attributed to the fact that the country is not financially sound currently to
cover the entire population under the HI scheme. Besides, it is relatively easy to start with
the formal sector rather than the informal sector workers since the latter is not very organised
for implementation and proper supervision.
21It is worth noting that the improvement has been relatively slow compared to other lower-
middle income countries particularly in Asia, South America and The Caribbean.
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1.3 Empirical Model
1.3.1 Policy Impact evaluation
Sample Selection
As will be explained later in the section, the empirical analysis to be carried out
in this study does not rely on data from randomised trials. Rather, the empirical
estimations here in this study are based on observational data. Therefore, simply
observing that a health insured person now spends relatively less on his/her
healthcare needs is not sufficient to conclude that the health insurance policy
caused a reduction in the healthcare expenses of the insured. For example,
a person may be witnessing a fall in healthcare expenditure simply because
he/she did not seek healthcare attention or probably resorted to traditional
(cheap) alternative for healthcare. This study also acknowledges that no one
individual can be observed simultaneously “with” and “without” the health
insurance policy. In addition, in reality, it is possible that the “NHIS-enrolled”
are very different from their non-enrolled counterparts in terms of, say, socio-
economic characteristics. For example, in Ghana, people working in the formal
sector22 are generally assumed to be relatively better-off economically because
they have relatively stable jobs that generally pay well. Therefore, they are
more likely to be able to afford better lifestyles than their counterparts in the
informal sector.
Also, formal sector employees generally are expected to have a certain level
of formal education (as result of the job entry requirements) that can eventu-
ally affect their way of life and subsequently their health expenses and health
outcomes. Closely related to the issue of education is the possibility that these
formal sector employees (SSNIT contributors) whose healthcare expenses are
currently highly subsidised under the NHIS scheme may be relatively older be-
cause of the time/period spent in acquiring formal education. Therefore, all
things being equal, the older a person is, the more likely (s)he may have health-
care needs23 which may translate into higher health expenditures. In this case,
the non-enrolled who are in the informal sector and who are more likely to be
relatively younger may incur lower health costs. Therefore, simply comparing
the healthcare expenses of these two groups may lead to an incorrect estimate
22i.e. those currently benefiting directly from the subsidised health expenditure
23This is based on the assumption that the stock of health depreciates with age; as typically
assumed in demand for health models.
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of the policy’s impact on OOP expenditure on healthcare. In other words, the
group that did not enrol under the health insurance scheme would not provide
a good estimate of the counterfactual needed for this analysis.
Therefore, acknowledging the possibility of sample selection into the health
insurance scheme, this study adopts the treatment effects approach to estimate
the impact of Ghana’s national health insurance scheme (NHIS) on out-of-pocket
(OOP) payment for healthcare. In doing so, this study also takes into account
any difference(s) between the “NHIS-enrolled” and the “non-enrolled”, by using
matching strategy to create a comparison group that is used to estimate the
counterfactual.
Treatment Evaluation
The methods used in estimating treatment effect rely on assumptions in order to
identify the causal effects.24 The obvious way to measure such a policy impact
will be to compare the average outcomes of the units affected by the policy
to the average outcome of the units without the policy. Such an approach
provides unbiased estimates when the analysis is carried out with experimental
data. However, experimental data are relatively costly to obtain and so many
of such treatment evaluation in the literature are carried out with observational
data. One disadvantage of using observational data in treatment evaluation has
to do with the non-random assignment to treatment given that for example;
individuals choose to be “treated”25 or otherwise. Yet, with a good estimate of
the counterfactual and the necessary assumptions made, observational data can
still provide a good estimate of the impact of the policy under consideration.
This study specifically uses propensity score matching (PSM) and difference-in-
difference (DID) estimation strategies to account for the presence of observable
and unobservable characteristics respectively that may bias the results.
Propensity Score Matching
As indicated earlier, in carrying out this analysis with an observational data,
it is obvious that the assignment to treatment is not random. The change to
be estimated is not directly observed given the cross-sectional nature of the
data and also the fact that no one person can be observed in both periods
(before and after policy implementation). Therefore, the treatment is assumed
24see Cameron and Trevidi (2005).
25being “treated” means to have the policy or to be affected by the policy.
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to be dependent on a set of observable characteristics and the study attempts to
estimate the average benefit gained from being insured (average treatment effect
on the treated) by first matching the “treated” with the non-treated. Matching
here is very useful since it assumes that; conditional on the observables, the
selection of participants is unrelated to the non-treated outcome. Instead of
matching on each observable characteristic, the study matches on the propensity
scores so that for each “treated” unit, we look for a non-treated unit whose
propensity score is sufficiently closer to the “treated”. Therefore assuming X is
a vector of the observable characteristics, and D is a binary indicator that takes
a value of 1 if an individual is “treated”; and 0 if otherwise; then the propensity
score matching (PSM) which is a conditional probability measure of treatment
participation given x is represented by p(x) as:
p(x) = Pr(D = 1|X = x) (1.1)
where x is the specific observable characteristic (Cameron and Trevidi, 2005).
In carrying out the propensity score matching (PSM), this study uses nearest-
neighbour matching method with the common support restriction in order to
improve the quality of the matches. In effect, this type of PSM takes each
“treated” unit and searches for the “control” units with the closest propensity
score (Becker and Ichino, 2002). So equation (1.1) simply means that the assign-
ment to treatment is random for individuals with the same propensity score so
that the treatment and the comparison groups become identical with respect to
their average characteristics.26 The variables: age, level of education (formal),
relationship to household head, religion, income and marital status were used
to carry out the propensity score matching. The nature of these variables in the
treatment and comparison groups for both “before” and “after” the matching
are presented in detail in the next section; where issues regarding the data for
this study are presented.
The use of matching alone implicitly assumes that unobservable characteris-
tics do not play any role in the assignment to treatment and the determination
of outcome. Therefore, the empirical estimations further employ difference-in-
difference (DID) estimation strategy to take into account unobservable charac-
teristics. By combining the propensity score matching (PSM) and the difference-
in-difference estimation strategy, the analysis attempts to minimise the bias(es)
26Conditioning on the propensity score is equivalent to getting rid of the correlation between
the observables and treatment assignment.
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associated with using only the PSM.
Difference-in-Difference Estimation
The use of treatment effect approach here in this study to estimate the im-
pact of the health insurance policy on OOP expenditure on healthcare requires
that we estimate the outcome for the same individuals “with” and “without”
participation into the health insurance programme at the same time. Unfortu-
nately, this is quite impossible particularly with observational data. However,
given that this study benefits from having data for “before” and “after” the
implementation of the policy, it becomes possible to employ the difference-in-
difference (DID) estimation strategy. Here, the comparison group created from
the propensity score matching is used to estimate the counterfactual needed for
the implementation of the DID estimation. By using the PSM and DID estima-
tion strategies, any variable that is constant across time between the “treated”
and the “control” units are eliminated.
The set-up for the DID estimation is based on the comparison of difference
in outcome variable for “before” and “after” the policy intervention. In the
absence of a panel data but with an aggregate data, the DID estimation can be
regarded as a version of fixed effects estimation and the strategy is additive in
nature for potential outcomes in the no-treatment region (Angrist and Pischke,
2008). The validity of the DID estimation rests on the assumption that both
“treated” and “untreated” groups have the same trend in the unobservable so
that the two groups have the same change in their means. In other words, in
the absence of the health insurance policy, the outcome in the treatment group
should move in the same way as that of the comparison group.27
In its simplest form, assume a fixed effect model as given by the specification
in equation (1.2):
Yit = φDit + δt + αi + εit (1.2)
where Yit is the outcome variable for the ith individual at time t, D is the
policy (or treatment) status, αi represents the individual specific fixed effect, δt
is the time-specific fixed effect and εit is the error term. Now suppose there are
two periods indicating “before” and “after” policy periods which are represented
by t1 and t2 respectively. Then the outcome in the two periods will be:
27This is known as the parallel trend assumption.
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Yi1 = φDi1 + δ1 + αi + εi1 (1.3)
Yi2 = φDi2 + δ2 + αi + εi2 (1.4)
taking the first difference, (1.4)− (1.3) gives:
∆Yit = φ∆Dit + ∆δt + ∆εit (1.5)
From equation (1.5), φ is the treatment effect for the ith individual and this
can be estimated by pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regression of ∆Yit on
∆Dit and a full set of time dummies (Cameron and Trevidi, 2005). However,
with the DID approach, in the first period (t1), the policy Di1 = 0 for all
individuals (i), but in period t2, Di2 = 0 for the “untreated” (since this group
does not receive the policy). Therefore dropping the time-subscript (t), equation
(1.5) becomes:
∆Yi = φDi + δ + vi (1.6)
where Di is the binary treatment variable indicating the treatment status of
the individual. From equation (1.6), the effect of treatment can be estimated
by an OLS regression of ∆Y on an intercept and the binary regressor D.
Now, defining the following; ∆y¯tr and ∆y¯nt to be the sample average of ∆Yi
in the “treated” and “untreated” groups respectively, then the OLS estimator
becomes:
φˆ = ∆y¯tr −∆y¯nt (1.7)
Equation (1.7) is the DID estimate this chapter is interested in computing
for the NHIS policy impact on OOP expenditure on healthcare. However in es-
timating this policy impact, we use an incremental regression approach whereby
we first consider a model without account for additional covariates. The sec-
ond model then controls for some respondents’ characteristics in addition to the
“type of health facility” a respondent visited for healthcare when (s)he was sick
(i.e. public or private health facility). Then in the third model, we include only
the covariates that were statistically significant in the previous (second) model.
It is worth noting that all DID estimations were carried out using clustered
standard errors.
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1.3.2 Utilisation of healthcare services
Recall that this study is also interested in investigating whether or being en-
rolled under the health insurance scheme influences a person’s decision to utilise
healthcare services from a health facility in Ghana. Considering this objective,
there are only two possible outcomes; whether a person consulted from a health
facility or not. Therefore, if the probability of going to a health facility is p,
then the probability of not going will be (1− p). Obviously, an OLS regression
of whether or not seeking care from a health facility on a set of independent
variables will not constrain the predicted probabilities to be between zero (0)
and one (1). In this case, a more appropriate model will be either the logit
or probit model which is formed by parameterising the probability (p) to be
dependent on a set of covariates (X) and a K ∗ 1 parameter vector β.
Now, suppose the dependent variable; y = 1 if a person goes to a health
facility; and y = 0 if otherwise, then assuming the function (F (.)) is the cdf of
the logistic distribution, we use the logit model which is specified as:
p = Pr [yi = 1|Xi] = Λ
(
X
′
β
)
=
eX
′
β
1 + eX
′β
, (1.8)
where; Λ(.) is simply the logistic cdf (Cameron and Trevidi, 2005). Equation
(1.8) ensures that the predicted probabilities lie between zero (0) and one (1).
Again, equation (1.8) is carried out by maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).
The first order conditions for the logit MLE are:
ΣNi=1(yi − Λ(X
′
β))Xi = 0 (1.9)
Then the marginal effect of the jth regressor for the ith individual is given
as:
∂pi
∂Xij
= pi(1− pi)βj = Λ(X ′β)
[
1− Λ(X ′β)
]
βi (1.10)
Therefore after estimating equation (1.8), our variable of interest will be the
insurance status of the respondent. So from equation (1.10), we compute the
marginal effect of a change in insurance status (from being uninsured to being
insured) on the probability that a person utilises a health facility.
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1.4 Data
1.4.1 Source of data
The study relied on data from the Fourth and Sixth Rounds of the Ghana Liv-
ing Standard Survey (GLSS) conducted by the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS).
These are both nation-wide surveys with focus on household as the key socio-
economic unit, providing information on the living conditions and well-being
of households in Ghana. The Ghana Living Standard Survey Four (GLSS 4)
and Ghana Living Standard Survey Six (GLSS 6) were conducted in 1998/1999
and 2012/2013 respectively. Although the GLSSs have generally focused more
on issues relating to inter alia monitoring and evaluating employment policies
and programmes, income generating and maintenance scheme, the surveys also
provide information on patterns of household consumption and expenditure dis-
aggregated at greater levels and hence the inclusion of information on healthcare
expenditure of respondents, which forms the basis for this study. Unfortunately,
no information on health outcomes is reported in the GLSS dataset. The sur-
vey instruments and methodology were based on those of earlier Rounds with
minimal modifications (GSS, 1997, 2013).
The sample frame of the GLSS 4 was based on the 1984 Population Census
and covered about 300 Enumeration Areas.28 Meanwhile, the GLSS 6 had its
sample frame based on the 2010 Population and Housing Census in Ghana and
covered 1,200 Enumeration Areas. The enumeration areas in both surveys were
then stratified based on the country’s ecological zones and these were further
stratified into rural or urban depending on the size of the locality. Each data
collection period lasted 12 months29 in order to ensure a continuous recording
of household consumption and expenditures and the associated changes if any.
In all, the GLSS 4 covered about 5,998 households and the GLSS 6 success-
fully covered 16,772 households. The financial support for the GLSS 4 came
from the government of Ghana, World Bank and the European Union. The
GLSS 6 was financially supported by the UK Department for International De-
velopment (DFID), International Labour Organisation (ILO), United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations International Chil-
dren’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the government of Ghana (GSS, 1997,
2013).
28Although the time between the census period and the survey was long, the census data
was the only best available data at the time (GSS, 1997).
29April 1998 to March 1999 for GLSS 4 and October 2012 to October 2013 for GLSS 6.
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1.4.2 Description of data
The GLSS places expenditure on food, clothing, furniture, health, education, etc
in separate sections. Although the demographic and socio-economic variables
were extracted from the other sections of the data, the analysis in this study
mainly focused on the section on health. The purpose of this section in the GLSS
was to gather information to measure the cost of medical care and the utilisation
of the different kinds of health services and facilities (GSS, 2013). Hence, the
study summed all expenditure-related questions on health in order to arrive at
the total out-of-pocket (OOP) healthcare expenditure; the dependent variable,
for each respondent.30 The recall period was two weeks preceding the survey in
order to minimise memory lapse (GSS, 2013).
Categorising household expenditures based on UN’s Classification of Indi-
vidual Consumption According to Purpose (COICOP), generally from the main
GLSS 4 dataset, healthcare expenditure formed about 5 percent of households’
total cash expenditure (GLSS 4 Report) within the recall period. This is quite
significant given that there are 12 main expenditure groups under this classifica-
tion and already, food and non-alcoholic beverage expenditure alone constituted
almost half (45.6 percent) of total cash expenditure. However, according to the
GLSS 6 survey and still under the same COICOP expenditure groups, health
expenditure formed about 1.6 percent of households’ total cash expenditure.
Well, any comparison of health expenditures between the two surveys should be
done carefully since at this point, the decline in the health expenditures can-
not necessarily be attributed to the NHIS policy since it is possible that people
were not utilising healthcare services or were rather relying on some cheap un-
safe traditional healthcare methods in order to avoid paying higher cost in the
appropriate health facilities.
The empirical estimations are carried out using a pooled cross-section of
GLSS 4 and 6 datasets. The set up for the empirical estimation in this chapter
is such that a person is either covered by the health insurance (formal sector
employee who is insured) or not; so that if (s)he is covered, (s)he is referred
to as “treated” and if not covered, (s)he is referred to as “untreated” or “con-
trol”.31 The focus here is to estimate how successful the national health insur-
ance scheme (NHIS) in Ghana has been by estimating the average treatment
effect on the “treated”. Furthermore, using only the GLSS 6 dataset and con-
30Each survey period asked multiple questions ranging from fees paid during registration,
consultation, treatment and administration of drugs at the health facility.
31All respondents are within the working age by Law, i.e. 15 - 60 years old.
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trolling for the availability or presence of health facility in one’s community,
we also look at the effect of being insured on seeking healthcare from a health
facility.
1.4.3 Description of explanatory variables
Empirical studies on health seeking behaviours and determinants of healthcare
services utilisation have revealed economic, cultural, physical and demographic
variables to be important (e.g. Yip, Wang, and Liu, 1998; Ensor and Cooper,
2004; Brugiavini and Pace, 2016). Therefore in carrying out the propensity score
matching and the difference-in-difference estimations, the following variables are
used: age (in completed years), marital status, income (in new Ghana cedis),32
level of formal education, relationship to household head, type of health facility
visited and religion. The level of education is a four-categorical dummy (none,
basic, secondary, and at least degree); and the “no education” group is always
used as the reference category.
The marital status considers whether or not the respondent is married;33
and the reference category is “married/union” group. A household head vari-
able is included as a dummy of whether or not the respondent is a household
head; those who do not head their households are the reference group. Given
that Ghana is a very religious country and the fact that religion influences the
believes of Ghanaians and hence plays a key role in healthcare decisions, the
“religion” variable is a four-categorical dummy (no religion, Christian, Muslim,
and other);34 and the “other” group is used as the reference category.
In Ghana, there are basically two types of health facilities; public and private.
Although the public sector plays a relatively bigger role in the health sector,
the contribution by the private sector cannot be underestimated. Given the
increasing population, disease burden and the fact that successive governments’
commitments to the health sector have not been very impressive, the private
and mission-based facilities have played an important role in the delivery of
healthcare and have also created employment opportunities in Ghana’s health
sector. They operate both in the rural and urban areas of the country. As
32The Bank of Ghana embarked on a re-denomination exercise of the “old cedi” (the local
currency) in July 2007 by setting ten thousand cedis to one new Ghana Cedi (GHC), which
is equivalent to one hundred Ghana Pesewas (Gp). That is 10,000cedis=GHC1=100Gp. The
major reasons for this exercise were to make transaction of the local currency convenient and
to reduce the risk of carrying loads of currency.
33Being married is made up formal marriage or other forms of union between couples.
34“other” group is made up Traditional/Spiritualist and other minority groups.
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earlier indicated, the health insurance package is provided in all public health
facilities at all levels. Typically in the private facilities which are not NHIS-
accredited, they are relatively less crowded with patients and therefore relatively
more convenient to receive healthcare. Again in Ghana, the private health sector
appear to be in some form of competition with the public sector in providing
quality healthcare. Therefore, they try to offer services that set them apart from
the public sector. Also, even in the few private facilities that accept the NHIS
cards, there are some reports of the existence of co-payment (which is illegal) in
the delivery of healthcare services. Therefore the type of health facility visited
is included in the regression model as a dummy of whether a respondent sought
healthcare from a public or private health facility.
Finally, given that the analysis uses data from “before” and “after” the
policy implementation periods, incomes and expenditures are all in real terms
in order to account for the influence of inflation.35
1.4.4 Summary statistics of variables
This subsection presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the
empirical analysis. The first part considers only the dependent variable for the
two surveys. Then, the independent variables are presented in the subsequent
subsection.
Dependent variables
Before presenting the descriptives, recall that from the data, the average OOP
expenses on healthcare was recorded with a recall period of two(2) weeks pre-
ceding the survey to minimise memory lapses. Therefore, the expenditure values
in Table 1.1 reflect this recall period.
Table 1.1: Descriptive of the dependent variable for the two periods36
Average OOP expenses for healthcare
Treated Control
GLSS 4 0.2903 0.4968
GLSS 6 1.0758 1.5803
35Note that the dependent variable which is out-of-pocket (OOP) healthcare expenditure is
also in real terms.
36Note that for consistency, all expenditure values have been converted into the new currency
values (new Ghana cedis (GHC))
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Considering the two periods under review, healthcare expenses increased for
both “treated” and “control” groups. For instance, in 1998/99 (GLSS4), the
“treated” spent about GHC0.30 on healthcare but in 2012/13 (GLSS6), the
corresponding amount was about GHC1.10. A similar upward trend is seen
among the comparison group (i.e. about GHC0.50 and GHC1.60 respectively).
This is not very surprising given the time difference between the two survey
periods and also if healthcare service is assumed to be a normal good.
Explanatory variables
As noted earlier, the study uses propensity score matching to control for bi-
ases from observable characteristics. Therefore Tables 1.2 and 1.3 present the
summary statistics for “before” and “after” matching. In this way, we see how
well the matching improves the comparability of the “treated” and “untreated”
groups.
Table 1.2: Descriptives of variables “before” and “after” matching (GLSS 4)
Mean t-test
Variable Sample Treated Untreated t-value p > t
age Unmatched 41.819 36.224 5.170 0.000
Matched 41.819 42.299 -0.410 0.685
Level of education
basic Unmatched 0.367 0.479 -2.530 0.012
Matched 0.367 0.318 0.980 0.326
secondary Unmatched 0.119 0.139 -0.660 0.507
Matched 0.119 0.172 -1.420 0.157
at least degree Unmatched 0.469 0.116 10.440 0.000
Matched 0.469 0.469 0.000 1.000
Marital status
single Unmatched 0.802 0.573 5.500 0.000
Matched 0.802 0.781 0.500 0.620
Relationship to household head
head Unmatched 0.774 0.736 0.980 0.326
Matched 0.774 0.853 -1.920 0.056
Religion
none Unmatched 0.034 0.049 -0.830 0.406
Matched 0.034 0.017 1.010 0.312
Christian Unmatched 0.898 0.785 3.320 0.001
Matched 0.898 0.921 -0.740 0.460
Muslim Unmatched 0.034 0.105 -2.890 0.004
Matched 0.034 0.044 -0.490 0.622
incomeGHC Unmatched 17.969 11.576 2.580 0.010
Matched 17.969 17.193 0.230 0.815
No. of obs 177 447
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Table 1.3: Descriptives of variables “before” and “after” matching (GLSS 6)
Mean t-test
Variable Sample Treated Untreated t-value p > t
age Unmatched 39.239 32.151 14.180 0.000
Matched 39.166 41.537 -3.820 0.000
Level of education
basic Unmatched 0.184 0.611 -20.280 0.000
Matched 0.186 0.156 1.490 0.137
secondary Unmatched 0.238 0.207 1.590 0.111
Matched 0.238 0.282 -1.910 0.057
at least degree Unmatched 0.566 0.047 32.770 0.000
Matched 0.564 0.540 0.910 0.361
Marital status
single Unmatched 0.716 0.537 8.030 0.000
Matched 0.713 0.686 1.120 0.263
Relationship to household head
head Unmatched 0.705 0.667 1.790 0.073
Matched 0.704 0.804 -4.460 0.000
Religion
none Unmatched 0.017 0.088 -6.440 0.000
Matched 0.017 0.014 0.380 0.700
Christian Unmatched 0.871 0.786 4.760 0.000
Matched 0.871 0.847 1.310 0.191
Muslim Unmatched 0.111 0.124 -0.870 0.387
Matched 0.110 0.138 -1.590 0.113
incomeGHC Unmatched 689.500 198.570 23.790 0.000
Matched 642.190 660.040 -0.640 0.525
No. of obs. 723 1,302
Columns 3 and 4 of Tables 1.2 and 1.3 report the means of the variables in the
“treated” and “untreated” groups for both the unmatched and matched samples.
There are appreciable disparities in the variables in the unmatched sample. For
instance in the GLSS 4 sample, the average age for the “treated” group is about
41.8 years while that of the “untreated” is 36.2 years (see columns 3 and 4 of
Table 1.2). The matching however reduces this difference greatly so that the
average ages are now relatively comparable in the matched sample (41.8 years
and 42.3 years for the “treated” and “untreated” groups respectively). Similarly
in the GLSS 6 sample (see Table 1.3), the average ages before matching are
39.2 and 32.2 years for the “treated” and “untreated” groups respectively. The
matched samples therefore provides relatively comparable ages of 39.2 and 41.5
years in the respective groups.
Regards the level of education in the GLSS 4 sample, about 36.7 percent of
the “treated” group have only basic education compared to 47.9 percent in the
“untreated” group in the unmatched sample. By the matching, the difference
between the two groups is reduced considerably to 36.7 and 31.8 percentages in
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the “treated” and “untreated” groups respectively with only basic education.
Similar conclusions can be made for the means of the other variables as shown in
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 after matching. It is however important to note that although
the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the mean values of the
two groups is rejected for a number of the variables (except for relationship to
household head in GLSS 4; and age, secondary level of education, and relation-
ship to household head in GLSS 6), through propensity score nearest-neighbour
matching, a comparable “untreated” group is generated for each cross-section
in order to be used for the difference-in-difference estimations.
1.5 Estimation of Results and Discussions
1.5.1 Estimation of model (1.7) for the entire sample
Given the objectives already outlined, the first part of the results looks at the
impact of the NHIS policy on out-of-pocket (OOP) healthcare expenditure for
the entire sample37 and this is presented in Tables 1.4. The estimations are
carried out using incremental regression approach. Therefore for the results
presented, model 1 does not control for additional covariates. In model 2, ad-
justments are made for some characteristics of the respondents. Now, given
the nature of Ghana’s health system and the operations of the health insurance
scheme, model 2 also includes a variable that measures whether a respondent
sought healthcare from a public or private health facility.38 Finally in model 3,
we include only covariates that were statistically significant from the previous
model. Therefore model 2 contains the full set of the explanatory variables used
in the regression analysis.
37Since the GLSSs do not contain data on health outcome(s), the impact of the policy on
health status cannot be estimated with the data. All means and standard errors are estimated
by linear regression.
38Recall that, all public health facilities are NHIS-accredited.
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Table 1.4: OLS regression of model (1.7) for the entire sample39
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
OOP. Health Exp. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Period
1.wave 1.0836*** 1.5158*** 1.4033***
(0.2499) (0.5022) (0.4535)
Treatment
1.treated -0.2065* -0.3782** -0.2619*
(0.1202) (0.1746) (0.15533)
Policy
1.insured -0.2980 -2.8026*** -2.7350***
(0.2702) (1.0525) (1.0352)
Marital status
1.married/union 0.0719
(0.2797)
age 0.1245** 0.1216**
(0.0590) (0.0563)
age squared -0.0013** -0.0013**
(0.0007) (0.0007)
income -0.2506* -0.2047
(0.1484) (0.1277)
Gender
1.male -0.0762
(0.2366)
Level of education
1.secondary 0.7889
(0.5247)
2.at least degree 0.3679
(0.2930)
Type of health facility
1.public 3.8294*** 3.8243***
(1.2474) (1.2470)
cons 0.4968*** -1.7414* -1.5834*
(0.1062) (0.9467) (0.9536)
No. of Obs. 2,641
Inference: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05; and ∗p < 0.1. Clustered std. errors in parentheses
From Table 1.4, the difference-in-difference (DID) estimation for the entire
sample yields a statistically significant negative impact of the national health
insurance scheme (NHIS) on out-of-pocket (OOP) healthcare expenditure in
models 2 and 3.40 That is, given the recall period, the NHIS policy is found
to have reduced OOP healthcare expenditure by about GHC3.00. These are
statistically significant at all conventional levels (see models 2 and 3 of Table
1.4). The implication of the result is that, the insured are comparatively spend-
ing less on health which further suggests that the health insurance scheme is
serving as a cushion against health expenditure shock for beneficiaries. The
39Model 1 estimates the policy impact without controlling for other covariates. Model 2
controls for some characteristics of the respondents in addition to the type of health facil-
ity visited for healthcare. Then in model 3, we control for only the covariates that were
statistically significant as indicated in model 2.
40The estimated policy impact is represented by the variable “policy (or insured)” and it is
an interaction between wave and treatment status.
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result obtained here is in contrast with earlier finding by Brugiavini and Pace
(2016) where they found only a weak effect of the policy on out-of-pocket health-
care expenditure.41 As indicated earlier, Brugiavini and Pace (2016) relied on a
cross-sectional data of the Ghana Demographic and Health Survey (GDHS 2013
dataset). The GDHS data is constrained in many ways and therefore estimating
the impact of the NHIS policy on OOP healthcare expenditure with that kind
of dataset can be criticised for a number of issues.
First, although the GDHS is nationally-representative in nature, the survey
does not contain information on certain important variables such as income,
value of wealth and expenditure on variables such as healthcare which is key for
this kind of analysis. Here, the only information on living standard is provided in
terms of wealth index (in quintiles) which obviously provides only an aggregated
information on household living standard. Again, in their analysis, they failed to
control for the “the type of health facility” a respondent visited which is quite
critical given that the NHIS-package is not provided in most private health
facilities.
Second, even though the data includes the health insurance status,42 the
outcome variable of interest which is out-of-pocket healthcare expenditure is
not recorded in the data. The closest variable which the data collected is a
“yes” or “no” answer to the question of whether or not a respondent had to pay
for healthcare service received in any facility. Therefore, the nature of the health
expenditure information available in the GDHS dataset compelled Brugiavini
and Pace (2016) to carry out only an extensive margin analysis using probit
models. This renders their results of insignificant effect of the NHIS policy on
out-of-pocket expenditure on healthcare incomplete. Aside from the estimated
policy impact, this study further estimated a logit regression model to find out
if the insurance status of an individual influences his or her decision to seek
healthcare from a health facility; and this is presented later in the section.
1.5.2 Estimation of model (1.7) by gender
As noted earlier, men and women have different healthcare needs which may in-
fluence their demand for healthcare services and expenditures incurred. There-
fore, the novelty and another interesting part of the analyses lies in the gender
perspective of the evaluation. In this case, the policy impact is disaggregated
41However, they provide evidence of increased utilisation of healthcare services by the in-
sured.
42i.e. whether or not a respondent is insured
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by gender to provide an in-depth evaluation of the NHIS policy (presented in
Tables 1.5 and 1.6). Besides, in estimating the policy impact by gender, we also
get to see the behaviour of other covariates in respective samples (particularly
if there are any variation(s)).
Table 1.5: OLS regression of model (1.7) for the female sample43
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
OOP. Health Exp. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Period
1.wave 1.5037*** 2.2006* 1.2341***
(0.5287) (1.3136) (0.3736)
Treatment
1.treated 0.0754 -0.1546 0.0241
(0.1341) (0.3455) (0.1379)
Policy
1.insured -1.0342* -2.9391* -3.2770*
(0.5408) (1.5230) (1.7653)
Marital status
1.married/union -0.3859
(0.5693)
age 0.2806
(0.1992)
age squared -0.0033
(0.0023)
income -0.3918
(0.3790)
Level of education
1.secondary 0.5034
(0.7678)
2.at least degree 0.3888
(0.4211)
Type of health facility
1.public 3.4493* 3.3379*
(1.9213) (1.8478)
cons 0.3787*** -4.1194 0.3787***
(0.0776) (3.0417) (0.0776)
No. of Obs. 702
Inference: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05; and ∗p < 0.1. Clustered std. errors in parentheses
Here in the female sample, the effect of the health insurance policy remains
statistically significant whether or not we control for additional covariates; al-
though this is only weakly significant (see the variable “insured” in columns 2,
3 and 4). However, the magnitude of the policy impact is higher in models that
control for respondents characteristics.
43Model 1 estimates the policy impact without controlling for other covariates. Model 2
controls for some characteristics of the respondents in addition to the type of health facil-
ity visited for healthcare. Then in model 3, we control for only the covariates that were
statistically significant as indicated in model 2.
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Table 1.6: OLS regression of model (1.7) for the male sample44
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
OOP. Health Exp. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Period
1.wave 0.9678*** 1.3112** 0.7276***
(0.2862) (0.5324) (0.1904)
Treatment
1.treated -0.3420** -0.4975** -0.4205**
(0.1493) (-0.2107) (0.1700)
Policy
1.insured 0.0015 -2.6946** -2.7654**
(0.3211) (1.3038) (1.3357)
Marital status
1.married/union 0.2819
(0.3308)
age 0.0720* 0.0101
(0.0418) (0.0079)
age squared -0.0008
(0.0005)
income -0.2117
(0.1578)
Level of education
1.secondary 0.8956
(0.6567)
2.at least degree 0.3835
(0.3601)
Type of health facility
1.public 4.0091** 3.9622**
(1.5595) (1.5472)
cons 0.5372*** -0.9626 0.1495
(0.1390) (0.8167) (0.2751)
No. of Obs. 1,939
Inference: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05; and ∗p < 0.1. Clustered std. errors in parentheses
Similar to the trend observed in the estimation for the entire sample, from
Table 1.6, the statistical significance of the policy is only evident in models 2 and
3 perhaps emphasising why it is important to control for some covariates. Unlike
the results of models 2 and 3 in the male sample, the somehow consistency in
the significance of the NHIS policy in the female sample (as in Table 1.5) may
be a signal that, perhaps females are relatively taking more advantage of the
scheme than their male counterparts.
Considering model 2 where we have the full set of covariates being controlled
for in the regression, the results in Tables 1.5 and 1.6 are not very different in
terms of the magnitude of the policy impact estimated; i.e. about GHC3.00
reduction in OOP expenses for health with respect to the recall period of two
(2) preceding the surveys. So generally, there is an evidence of a statistically
44Model 1 estimates the policy impact without controlling for other covariates. Model 2
controls for some characteristics of the respondents in addition to the type of health facil-
ity visited for healthcare. Then in model 3, we control for only the covariates that were
statistically significant as indicated in model 2.
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significant negative effect of the health insurance policy on OOP healthcare
expenditure. In other words, the NHIS policy appears to be reducing the burden
or the amount people (insured) spend as OOP payment for healthcare service
both in the male and female samples independently. The magnitude of the
policy impact is only marginally higher in the female sample.
1.5.3 Estimation of model (1.7) by type of health facility
This part of the empirical estimations is to assess whether the benefits obtained
from being enrolled under the NHIS scheme vary by the type of health facil-
ity consulted for healthcare. As noted earlier, automatically, all public health
facilities (regardless of the level) accept the NHIS cards. Therefore, here, we
estimate the policy’s impact independently for patients who visited public or
private health facility; and this is represented in Table 1.7.
Table 1.7: OLS regression of model (1.7) for the type of facility45
Public facility Private facility
OOP. Health Exp. Coef. Coef.
Period
1.wave 13.9494*** 0.4038***
(4.5422) (0.0973)
Treatment
1.treated 0.9595 -0.3102**
(1.3883) (0.1521)
Policy
1.insured -8.9578*** 0.1545
(3.0602) (0.1183)
Marital status
1.married/union 0.6258 -0.0594
(1.1252) (0.0639)
age 0.7628** -0.0014
(0.3490) (0.0123)
age squared -0.0086** 0.0001
(0.0040) (0.0002)
Gender
1.male -0.1303 -0.0311
(0.8160) (0.0489)
income -1.7427* 0.0173
(0.9378) (0.0213)
Level of education
1.secondary 3.0776 0.0248
(2.3106) (0.0410)
2.at least degree 1.9067 0.1574
(1.5752) (0.1342)
cons -11.9353** 0.4065*
(5.7994) (0.2118)
No. of Obs. 655 1,986
Inference: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05; and ∗p < 0.1. Clustered std. errors in parentheses.
45Column 2 estimates the policy impact for only patients who visited a public health facility
and column 3 does it for those who visited a private health facility. Clustered standard errors
are in parentheses.
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From Table 1.7, the variable of interest (insured) is statistically significant
only in the public health facility sample. Specifically, patients who visited a
public health facilities recorded about GHC9.00 reduction in their OOP ex-
penses on healthcare with respect to the recall period. This is of course not
surprising given that these facilities are automatically NHIS-accredited. On the
other hand, the NHIS policy was not statistically significant among patients
who opted for private health facilities.
1.5.4 Healthcare service utilisation
Using a cross-section of the GLSS6 dataset, this part of the analysis presents the
marginal effects after estimating equation (1.8). The purpose is to estimate the
determinants of seeking healthcare from a health facility. Seeking healthcare
from a health facility is necessary for patients to receive the right care from
qualified health personnel.
In estimating equation (1.8), we acknowledge that the decision to utilise
healthcare from a health facility is jointly determined by demand and supply
side factors. Therefore, an important aspect in the estimation was to control
for a supply-side variable(s). In this regard, the empirical estimation also con-
trols for the presence or availability of health facility in the community that a
respondents resides.46 We also control for the region of residence in order to
account for any regional imbalances that may exit in terms of infrastructure and
other opportunities that may influence a person’s healthcare decisions.
46This variable was obtained from the community-level data.
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Table 1.8: Healthcare utilisation from a health facility47
Healthcare utilisation Marginal Effects Standard Error
Insurance status
1. insured 0.0342** 0.0165
Presence of health facility
2.no -0.0165 0.0188
age 0.0010 0.0024
age squared 0.0000 0.0000
Gender
1. male -0.0183 0.0151
Formal education
2. no 0.0027 0.0171
income -0.0055 0.0043
Marital status
2.married/union 0.0249 0.0245
3.divorced/widowed/sep. 0.0666** 0.0336
Region of residence
2.Central -0.0444 0.0349
3.Greater Accra -0.1029*** 0.0397
4.Volta 0.0695* 0.0404
5.Eastern -0.0509 0.0317
6.Ashanti 0.0282 0.0447
7.Brong Ahafo -0.0224 0.0346
8.Northern -0.0533 0.0331
9.Upper East 0.0237 0.0539
10.Upper West -0.0929*** 0.0286
No. of obs. 2,295
Inference: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05; and ∗p < 0.1. Std. errors are clustered adjusted.
Now from Table 1.8, the important point is the fact the insured are more
likely to seek care from a health facility than their uninsured counterparts.
This suggests that the health insurance policy is encouraging the enrolled to
seek appropriate care for their health needs. For a developing country such
as Ghana where a lot of people either resort to self-medication or wait until
their illness got worse before going to a health facility in order to avoid paying
relatively higher costs at health facilities, such an outcome is quite encouraging
in order to promote good health practices to ensure a healthy population.
In effect, the negative effect of the NHIS policy on health expenditure ob-
tained in the female sample here in this study may even explain why in the same
study by Brugiavini and Pace (2016), they found an increase in utilisation of
maternal healthcare services; specifically antenatal check-ups, institutional de-
47In Ghana, there are ten (10) administrative regions. Therefore, the “region of residence”
variable controls for the specific region in which the respondent lives in and “Western region”
is used as the reference category. This variable is included to capture the differences in
availability and accessibility of healthcare services.
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livery48 and supervised delivery49 among insured women after they controlled
for self selection into the health insurance programme. The statistically neg-
ative impact of the policy in the male sample is also very encouraging. Even
here, the statistical significance improves compared to the female sample. This
perhaps emphasises the importance of health insurance, which may help cushion
the insured against any possible health expenditure shocks.
1.6 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter of the thesis has been to estimate the impact of Ghana’s
national health insurance scheme (NHIS) on out-of-pocket (OOP) healthcare
expenditure and to find out if the insurance status of a person influences his
or her decision to seek healthcare from a health facility. Although the NHIS in
Ghana is currently the only major social protection programme implemented
by the government of Ghana, not much has been done regards empirical study
to estimate quantitatively the impact of the scheme on out-of-pocket healthcare
expenditure which is one of the scheme’s main objectives. The closest empirical
study in this regard is a recent work by Brugiavini and Pace (2016); where they
looked at the effect of Ghana’s NHIS on maternity care and expenditure on
health. As earlier noted, their choice of dataset and empirical model for this
kind of analysis makes their results incomplete. Therefore, unlike Brugiavini
and Pace (2016), the use of propensity score matching (PSM) and difference-
in-difference (DID) estimation strategies in this study removes biases that were
not earlier accounted for in the work by Brugiavini and Pace (2016). This
improves the completeness of the analysis and increases the confidence in the
results obtained in this study.
The negative impact of the NHIS policy on OOP healthcare expenditure
(as presented in models 2 and 3 of Tables 1.4 to 1.6) is a step in the right
direction since the scheme is helping reduce the burden of OOP payment for
healthcare; which is the scheme’s main objective. This result also implies that
the beneficiaries now have relatively higher disposable income (because of the
reduction in their health expenditures) which they can spend on other equally
important goods and services or even save for the future. In addition, controlling
for the availability or presence of health facility in the community in which a
48i.e. delivery in a health facility
49i.e. delivery supervised by a professionally trained health personnel such as doctor, nurse,
midwife or community health officer.
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person resides, we found that the insured are more likely to seek healthcare from
a health facility than their uninsured counterparts. This is of course good for
the promotion of good health; which needs to be encouraged.
Now, given that currently the NHIS is highly subsidised for formal sector em-
ployees drawing pension on Social Security National Insurance Trust (SSNIT),
this study recommends that some incentives are put in place to encourage vol-
untary participation into the programme from the informal sector in order to
reduce the burden of OOP payment for healthcare for them too. This can ensure
that there is improvement in the health of all. Also, the policy impact estimated
with respect to public and private health facility independently, emphasises the
importance of the “type of health facility” visited in deriving any benefits from
the policy. Therefore, to ensure that benefits from the health insurance policy
is increased, more private health facilities should be accredited and encouraged
to provide the NHIS package. This can even reduce the pressures in the public
health facilities which is a contributing factor to the long waiting hours in public
health facilities.
Meanwhile, certain challenges associated with the scheme such as delay in
reimbursement of NHIS funds to accredited health facilities and other service
providers and the attitudes of health personnel in NHIS-accredited facilities need
to be improved in order ensure smooth running of the scheme. Finally, even
though the NHIS package covers about 90 percent of the disease burden in the
country, certain lifestyle diseases (e.g. kidney-related, lung-related, stroke, etc.)
which are currently not covered under the service package should be considered
since these kinds of diseases are gradually becoming a matter of public health
concern because of the change in the lifestyle of the average Ghanaian.
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Chapter 2
Socio-economic Inequality
in Health Status and
Health Expenditure -
evidence from Nigeria
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Abstract
Aside from being ranked among the most unequal countries in the world, there is evidence
of health disparities and comparatively poor health indicators in Nigeria. Commonly-cited
evidence suggest inequality in socio-economic status (SES) harms health but this hypothesis
remains inconclusive. Meanwhile, most studies in the developing world have focused on ma-
ternal and child health creating a research gap in other aspects of health. In addition, many
exiting studies have relied on methods that fail to account for unobserved heterogeneity be-
tween individuals. Using data from Nigeria, this paper estimates the effect of SES inequality
on inequality in health status and health expenditure using concentration indices and fixed
effect (FE) models. The relationship between SES and health inequality shrinks in models
that account for other covariates. In the FE models, the SES remains statistically significant
in explaining inequality in health status and this finding holds for two indicators of SES:
consumption and wealth. However, the relationship between SES and inequality in health
expenditure disappears in the FE model for all three SES indicators (consumption, income
and wealth). Meanwhile, a decomposition analysis shows that reducing health inequalities is
not a simple case of redistributive policies but age, marital status, household size and residing
in rural areas also have appreciable contributions to health inequalities.
Keywords: socio-economic status, concentration index, health inequality
JEL: I14 D63
2.1 Introduction
Nigeria has one of the fastest growing economies with petroleum oil resources
playing a major role in the growth of the economy. The country is ranked 6th
and 8th in the world in terms of oil production and exportation respectively;
and has the 10th largest proven reserves (UNICEF, 2007). Although Nigeria is
rich, it cannot boast of basic facilities in many parts of the country particularly
in the north; indicating there is a skewed distribution of Nigeria’s wealth. In-
equality is increasingly becoming a matter of concern in Nigeria (UNDP, 2009)
such that the country is ranked 47th1 when it comes to inequality with a Gini
index of about 0.442; placing the country among the most unequal countries in
the world. For instance, the income shares held by the highest 20 and 10 percent
of the population in 2009 were estimated at 49 and 33 percentages respectively.
Meanwhile, the income share of the lowest 10 percent of the population was just
about 2 percent. In addition, about 53.47 percent of the population were esti-
mated poor using the poverty headcount ratio of USD 1.90 per day3. The high
poverty problem is suggested to be a characteristic of the high inequality level
prevailing in the country and this systematic structure of inequity may among
other things imply limited opportunities and low purchasing power (UNDP,
2009); which may include expenditure on healthcare services.
A comparison of the country’s health indicators to other countries within
the same income group4 and/or the group’s average shows Nigeria lags behind
in almost all indicators. For example, in terms of life expectancy at birth, as
at 2014, while a child born in a lower-middle income country was expected to
live for 67.15 years, in Nigeria, such a child could only live for 52.74 years.
Meanwhile, the life expectancy for other lower-middle income countries within
the same period was; Ghana (61.31 years), Kenya (61.58 years), India (68.01
years), Morocco (74.02 years) and Vietnam (75.63 years). The average maternal
mortality ratio for the lower-middle income group was estimated at 251 deaths
per 100,000 live-births in 2015; but in Nigeria, it was 814 deaths per 100,000 live-
births. Infant and under-five mortality rates within the same period averaged
40 and 53 deaths per 1,000 live-births respectively for the lower-middle income
group; but in Nigeria, these were 69 and 109 deaths per 1,000 live-births respec-
1This is according to CIA.
2The Gini index is according to The World Bank’s world development indicators (WDI).
3Poverty rate is with respect to 2011 purchasing power parity. All estimates are sourced
from the WDI.
4Nigeria is classified as a lower-middle-income country.
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tively. Meanwhile, healthcare expenditure remains high in Nigeria with no well
functioning health insurance system making patients bear almost all healthcare
expenditures. Specifically, out-of-pocket (OOP) healthcare expenditure is es-
timated at 72 percent of total expenditure on health while this is averaged at
about 56 percent within the lower-middle income group,5 representing a huge
burden on the average Nigerian.
Even within the country, there are great disparities in health (WHO, 2014)
and these exit in various forms. Health inequity is not only very visible in
the rural areas and urban slums but also prevails in the northern part of the
country, where the incidence of poverty is also the highest (see. Audu, Ojua,
Ishor, and Abari, 2013; Alaba, Adeoti, and Abiodun, 2012). For instance in
2011, the infant mortality rate (123 deaths per 1,000 live-births) in the north
western part of the country was more than two times that for the south western
zone (NBS, 2011).6 The unacceptable high rate of poverty in the northern part
of the country may have some repercussion(s) on how much they spend or might
spend on healthcare even when the need arises. Meanwhile, the use of maternal
healthcare services in the form of antenatal care and supervised delivery is found
to be disproportionately lower among the poor7 and the uneducated women
(Obiyan and Kumar, 2015). With respect to gender disparities, for the year
2014, the WDI estimate for survival to age 65 in terms of percentage of cohort
for females was 47.57, while that for males was 44.35. Access to healthcare
service is generally low in the rural areas of the country (Alaba et al., 2012).
Recognising the unacceptable health inequities within and between coun-
tries and economic status as being one of the social determinants of health,
the heads of government, ministers and government representatives during the
World Conference on “Social Determinants of Health” on 21st October, 2011 ex-
pressed their commitment to reduce health inequities and to achieve other global
priorities (WHO, 2011). Nonetheless, considerable effort has been devoted to
the socio-economic status (SES) and health inequality hypothesis in the litera-
ture but empirical evidence seems to suggest that this debate is far from being
settled. That is, studies that support the SES health inequality hypothesis have
provided evidence to argue that health8 is affected by the distribution of socio-
economic status within a society (see. Ben-Shlomo et al., 1996; Kaplan et al.,
5Figures sourced from WDI.
6i.e. 55 deaths per 1,000 live-births.
7poverty here is measured by their wealth index
8of an individual and/or population
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1996; Kawachi and Kennedy, 1997; Kennedy et al., 1998; Shibuya et al., 2002;
Wagstaff, 2005; Wagstaff et al., 2003). In Nigeria, health inequalities are found
to be evident in the distribution of health facilities (Ityavyar, 1988; Iyun, 1988;
Nwakeze and Kandala, 2011); access to healthcare services (Alaba et al., 2012;
Adeyanju, Tubeuf, and Ensor, 2016; Olaleye, Ogwumike, and Olaniyan, 2013);
utilisation of services (Ityavyar, 1988; Obiyan and Kumar, 2015); and health out-
come (Antai, 2011). Meanwhile there are also empirical findings that contrast
this SES health inequality hypothesis (see for example: Beckfield, 2004; Bidani
and Ravallion, 1997; Daly et al., 1998; Fiscella and Franks, 1997; Kennedy et al.,
1998; Mellor and Milyo, 2002; Osler et al., 2002; Sturm and Gresenz, 2002).
Unfortunately, the main focus of many studies on this relationship in the
developing world including Nigeria has been on maternal and child health (see.
Wagstaff, 2000, 2005; Wagstaff et al., 2003; Wagstaff and Watanabe, 2003); and
many have used methods that fail to control for other covariates or unobserved
heterogeneity among respondents; and thereby yielding results that appear to
support the SES health inequality hypothesis. Therefore, there is a dearth of
empirical study on the effect of SES inequality on other aspects of health and
health-related behaviours. For instance, among the existing empirical studies on
inequality in health, relatively very little about inequalities in self-rated health
such as functional disabilities that inhibit an individual’s ability to carry out
everyday activity is investigated in Africa’s context (Sibanda and Doctor, 2013).
Now, with Nigeria’s high inequality level and being a country where healthcare
expenses are almost entirely financed by individuals themselves through direct
payments from one’s pocket because there are no well functioning health in-
surance systems, the rich are expected to be in a position to spend relatively
more on their health for better health outcomes. Meanwhile, the extent of
out-of-pocket payment for healthcare services is also likely to put the poor par-
ticularly, in a great deal of financial risk which may deter their access and util-
isation of appropriate healthcare services and subsequently affect their quality
of health. So whether or not the problem of health inequalities can be reduced
by redistributive policies requires an investigation of the effect of disparities in
socio-economic status on health. Therefore the purpose for this study is to in-
vestigate if there exist inequality in health status and health expenditures in
Nigeria and whether or not these inequalities can be systematically attributed
to inequality in socio-economic status. In doing these, the empirical questions
this chapter seeks to address are; what is the extent of SES inequality in health-
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care expenditure and health status in Nigeria?9 does the SES inequality in
health status and/or health expenditures hold after controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity among Nigerians? and how do factors vary in terms of their con-
tribution to socio-economic inequalities in health among Nigerians? Given that
such an analysis needs information on households’ economic status, it is worth
noting that the choice of SES indicator is also very critical for effective policy
targeting. Therefore, the study uses three(3) SES measures (consumption, in-
come and wealth) to independently investigate the issues at hand in order to
present a more complete analysis.
This study contributes to the empirical evidence on the SES inequality in
health hypothesis (from a developing country perspective) by using data from
Nigeria, considering health variables that have not received relatively much
attention in the empirical literature in Sub Sahara Africa and accounting for
unmeasured heterogeneities using fixed effect (FE) regression models.10 There-
fore, the findings in this study can provide evidence as to whether the disparities
in health status and health expenditures in Nigeria can be attributed to the in-
equality in socio-economic status. As already indicated, the socio-economic sta-
tus here is measured independently by relative consumption, income and wealth
levels. In addition, the health inequalities are measured by concentration indices
in order to incorporate the socio-economic dimension of differences in health.
The health inequality is further decomposed to find out which demographic
factors are important contributors to health differences.
By recognising that any progress towards reducing inequalities in health is
largely dependent on the ability of empirical studies to identify and measure
the extent and magnitude of all aspects of inequalities (Sibanda and Doctor,
2013), then carrying out such a study may be useful to policy makers in terms
of a holistic and effective healthcare policy targeting in Nigeria. For instance,
a significant SES-health status inequality means redistribution of that living
standard measure (i.e. the socio-economic status proxy) can help reduce SES-
related inequality in health status. Thus the study’s approach of using different
SES measures in computing the inequality in health in an FE regression model
can help provide an unbiased estimate of the effect of socio-economic inequality
9Health status in this study is measured by using the activities of daily living (ADL) indica-
tors. These ADLs measure the functional capabilities of an individual. Therefore one novelty
in this study lies in the choice of the health variables used in estimating health equalities.
10Note that the analysis also explores the fixed effect vector decomposition (fevd) estimation
technique in order to estimate time-invariant covariates and also to account for rarely changing
covariates.
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on health.
Again, such empirical evidence from Nigeria could be useful for other devel-
oping countries that share Nigeria’s characteristics because of her position in
Africa and sometimes referred as the “Giant of Africa”; owing to its population11
and economy. The World Bank for instance considers Nigeria to be an emerging
economy given that it overtook South Africa in 2014 to become Africa’s largest
economy. Finally, the choice of Nigeria is also motivated by the availability of
a panel data,12 which is deemed useful to understand better how inequality in
health varies with socio-economic status among the same respondents.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows; section 2.2 presents the
empirical method used in this study. Here, the health concentration index is
explained followed by the method used in decomposing the health inequality. It
also shows how the variables used in the empirical estimation are measured. In
section 2.3, the data source and some descriptives of the explanatory variables
are presented. The empirical results and discussions are presented in sections
2.4 and 2.5 respectively. The final section concludes the chapter.
2.2 Empirical Method
The empirical strategy used in this study begins with the estimation of concen-
tration index (CI) of health status and healthcare expenditure independently
for each wave; using three different SES indicators (consumption, income and
wealth) in order to provide an insight into the extent and trend in SES health
inequality for the period under consideration. Using a balanced-panel data, the
next step involves computing the health inequality using the standard ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression models. The analysis then uses a model (FE
regression technique)13 that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity between in-
dividuals to further examine the hypothesis. The final part of the analysis
decomposes the computed health concentration indices specifically for models
in which the SES inequality emerge significant in explaining health-related in-
equality.
11Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa with a population of about 177.5 million
12which is not common in developing countries
13i.e. both the standard fixed effect model and the fixed effect vector decomposition tech-
nique
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2.2.1 Measuring health inequality
In computing the inequalities in the selected health variables, this study uses
health concentration indices. The concentration index is one of the two measures
argued to be best suited for the measurement of inequality in health because
of its ability to reflect the socio-economic dimension to inequalities in health
(Wagstaff, Paci, and Doorslaer, 1991; Doorslaer, Wagstaff, Bleichrodt, Calonge,
Gerdtham, Gerfin, Geurts, Gross, Hakkinen, Leu, O’Donnell, Propper, Puffer,
Rodriguez, Sundberg, and Winkelhake, 1997; O’Donnell et al., 2008).14 Other
conventional measures of inequality such as the range, Gini coefficient, index
of dissimilarity and coefficient of variation are criticised for being unable to
reflect the socio-economic dimension to health inequalities (Wagstaff et al., 1991;
Doorslaer et al., 1997; Wildman, 2003a). In addition, the concentration index
reflects the experiences of the entire population making it sensitive to changes
in the distribution of the population across socio-economic groups (Doorslaer
et al., 1997).
The concentration index (CI) is based on the concept of concentration
curve. The concentration curve here shows the share of the health variable
that is accounted for by the cumulative proportions of individuals in the popu-
lation ranked from the most disadvantaged (poorest) to the least disadvantaged
(O’Donnell et al., 2008). Therefore, the CI is defined as twice the area between
the concentration curve and the diagonal (i.e. the 45o line which is also known
as the line of equality) and is formally specified as:
CI = 1− 2
∫ 1
0
Lh(p)dp (2.1)
where; the function Lh(p) represents the concentration curve.
Therefore the concentration index, similar to the Gini coefficient, measures
the relative inequality so that the concentration index remains unchanged if for
instance; everyone’s health variable is doubled (Wagstaff et al., 2003). The CI
is zero if there is no inequality in health, suggesting that the health variable is
equally distributed among the unit of analysis regardless of the living standard
rank. In this case, the Lh(p) coincides with the 45
o line. The CI is negative
if the Lh(p) lies above the 45
o line, and this means that the health variable
14The other measure is relative index of inequality (RII) and this is closely related to the
concentration index. That is, the RII is only equal to the concentration index divided by twice
the variance of the fractional rank of the unit of analysis in the SES distribution (Wagstaff
et al., 1991).
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is concentrated among the most disadvantaged.15 When the Lh(p) lies below
the diagonal, the CI is positive and this means that inequality in the health
variable is concentrated among the least disadvantaged (O’Donnell et al., 2008).
Therefore, from equation (2.1), the concentration index (CI) lies between −1
and 1.16
Now, with an individual-level analysis (as to be used in this study), let hi(i =
1, ..., n) which represents the health variable of interest for the ith individual be
a linear function of the socio-economic status (X) and be specified as:
h = g(X) (2.2)
If individuals are ranked in ascending order of their socio-economic status
(SES), then the concentration curve for h can be explained as the share of total
h received by observations with socio-economic status of X or less. Therefore
Fi [g(X)] is graphed against the population share of those SES no greater than
X, F (X) (Jenkins, 1980). Analogous to the specification in equation (2.1), the
concentration index of the health variable of interest can be defined as:
CIh = 1− 2
∫ X
0
Fi [g(X)] dF (X) (2.3)
where; Fi [g(X)] =
∫X
0
g(X)dF (X)/g¯(X) is the probability distribution
function of h; g¯(X) =
∫X
0
g(X)dF (X); and ”−” denotes “mean”. Meanwhile,
Kakwani (1980, pp.173) has shown that equation (2.3) can be written using
“convenient covariance” so that;
CIh =
2
E [g(X)]
cov [g(X), F (X)] (2.4)
Therefore following Kakwani (1980); Jenkins (1986); and Lerman and Yitzhaki
(1984) and analogous to equation (2.4), the health concentration index can also
be re-written as:
CIh =
2
h¯t
cov(hit, Rit) (2.5)
where; Rit is the fractional rank of the ith individual regards the SES dis-
tribution at time t so that cov(.) is the covariance between the health variable
15In other words, health inequality favours the poor.
16For instance, if the health variable in question is “good health”, then in the extreme case,
the CI is −1 when only the most disadvantage person is healthy and CI will be 1 when only
the least disadvantaged person is healthy.
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and the fractional rank; and h¯t is the mean of the health variable at time t.
Equation (2.5) clearly shows the dependence of the concentration index on
the socio-economic dimension to the distribution of the health variable which the
Gini coefficient for example does not. That is, given that the Lorenz curve ranks
individuals by their health (and not the SES variable), the Gini coefficient which
measures the area between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal fails to take into
account this socio-economic dimension in health inequality. In this case, using
the Gini coefficient does not address the extent to which inequalities in health are
systematically related to socio-economic status which this chapter is interested
in estimating. Therefore given that to calculate the Gini index for any health
variable, the unit of analysis must be ranked by the health variable and not the
socio-economic distribution, generally, the CI is not equal to the Gini index.
However, the concentration curve and CI will give the same result as the Lorenz
curve and the Gini index respectively if the ranking of the unit of analysis by
health is the same as the ranking by the socio-economic status (Wagstaff et al.,
1991). The specification in equation (2.5) also shows that the CI depends on the
health variable in question of all the unit of analysis which using the “range”
for instance fails to account for. That is, the range as a measure of health
inequality simply provides the inequality estimate by comparing the experiences
of the extreme socio-economic groups (Wagstaff et al., 1991).
Now, given the relation between covariance and ordinary least square (OLS)
regression and following Kakwani, Wagstaff, and Doorslaer (1997), an equivalent
estimate of the CI and standard error can be obtained by ranking individuals
according to their SES (as measured independently by consumption, income
and wealth in this paper) and running OLS regression on the model in (2.6).
That is:
2σ2R
[
hit
µ
]
= α+ δRit + εit (2.6)
where; µ = 1nΣ
n
i=1hi is the mean of the health variable; Rit =
i
n is the
fractional rank of the ith person with respect to the SES distribution at time
t so that, i = 1 for the most disadvantaged person and i = n for the least
disadvantaged individual in the sample; δ is an estimate of the CI; σ2R is the
variance of the fractional rank of individual i; α and εit are the intercept and
error terms respectively. Hence the left-hand-side of equation (2.6) is the trans-
formed health variable of interest which reflects the socio-economic dimension
to inequalities in health.
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Given that the probability distribution function F (X) in equation (2.3)
which is equivalent to the fractional rank of individuals (Ri) in the SES dis-
tribution always has a mean equal to 12 (Kakwani, 1980), the estimator δˆ which
measures the health concentration index is:
δˆ =
2
nµ
Σni=1(hi − µ)(Rit −
1
2
) (2.7)
According to O’Donnell et al. (2008), estimating the CI in this way provides
another interpretation of the CI as: the slope of the line that passes through the
heads of a parade of people ranked by their socio-economic status so that each
person’s height is proportional to his/her health variable which is expressed as
a fraction of its mean.
Equation (2.6) is therefore a simple bivariate OLS model that regresses the
transformed health variable on the fractional rank of the individual in the SES
distribution. From there, we can account for other covariates (j) by specifying:
2σ2R
[
hit
µ
]
= α+ δRit + ΣjψjZjit + εit (2.8)
where; j = 1, ..., J ; so that Zjit are the other covariates for individual i at
time t; δˆ is the estimated concentrated index (O’Donnell et al., 2008); and ψˆj
measures the effect of characteristic j on health inequality.
Since another important aspect of this paper is to account for unmeasured
heterogeneities in the analysis, the specifications in (2.9) and (2.10) are the
corresponding fixed effect (FE) models.
2σ2R
[
hit
µ
]
= αi + δRit + εit (2.9)
2σ2R
[
hit
µ
]
= αi + δRit + ΣjψjZjit + εit (2.10)
where; αi represent individual specific characteristics which were not ac-
counted for in the earlier specifications. The use of FE models makes it pos-
sible to account for time-invariant characteristics that may bias the inequality
in health estimates so that we can assess the net effect of inequality in socio-
economic status (SES) on inequality in health.
This study also explores the fixed effect vector decomposition (fevd) method
of estimation by Plumper and Troeger (2007), in order to adjust for the pres-
ence of any rarely-changing covariates. The fevd model is built on the account
9
that there are some characteristics that are almost invariant with respect to the
period under consideration. Given that the FE model performs only “within”
transformation on all variables including those with relatively little “within”
variances, the variance of the estimates for these slowly changing variables ap-
proaches infinity which means that in instances where the “within” variances
are very small relative to the “between” variances, the point estimates of the
FE estimator become unreliable.17
Therefore, by using the fevd technique, we estimate a model of the form:
2σ2R
[
hit
µ
]
= αi + δRit + ΣjψjZjit + ΣmφmWmit + εit (2.11)
where; m = 1, ....M ; so that Wmit are the rarely changing covariates for the
ith individual at time t; and φm measures the effect of covariate m on inequality
in that health variable under consideration.
In this case, the fevd technique invariably carries out three estimations by
first running the standard FE estimation. In the second stage, the procedure
divides the unit effects into explained and unexplained parts by regressing the
unit effects on the rarely changing covariates. The final stage performs a pooled-
OLS estimation of the original model by including all covariates (time varying,
time-invariant and the rarely changing variables) and the unexplained part of
the FE vector. In effect, the use of the fevd model is expected to improve the
reliability of the estimation in the presence of covariates with very low “within”
variance relative to the “between” variance.
2.2.2 Decomposition of health inequality
Inequality decomposition has received significant attention in the literature
whether looked at it from a theoretical (a priori reasoning) or empirical (re-
gression based) perspective. Whichever way, Cowell and Fiorio (2011) have
shown how the two approaches can be reconciled such that the regression based
(RB) methodology can be derived from the a priori approach to factor-source
decomposition. This section uses the RB methodology to provide an insight
into SES inequality in health decomposition by subgroups. Conducting such an
analysis is particularly useful for effective policy targeting. Therefore, following
Cowell and Fiorio (2011), assume a basic model of the form:
17See Plumper and Troeger (2007) for detailed discussions on the estimation of rarely chang-
ing variables.
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H = β0 + β1X2 + ...+ βkXk + ε (2.12)
where H is the health status; X represent the explanatory variables; and ε
is the error term. Let us further assume X1 to be a discrete random variable
that takes only finite number of values {m = 1, 2, ..., t1}.
If Xk,m := ι.Xk; where ι is an indicator function which is equal to 1 if
X1 = m and equal to 0 if otherwise, then equation (2.12) can be represented
for the subgroup of interest (say m) as:
Hm = β0,m + β1,mX1,m + Σ
K
k=2βk,mXk,m + U (2.13)
where U is the corresponding error term. If we define; Pm = Pr(X1 = X1,m) to
be the proportion of the population for which X1 = X1,m, then, within-group
inequality in health can be represented by:
Iw(H) = Σ
t1
m=1WmI(Hm) (2.14)
where, t1 is the number of groups considered and Wm is the weight which is a
function of Pm and Hm. The overall inequality in health I(H) is the summation
of within-group (Iw(H)) and between-group (Ib(H)) inequality represented by:
I(H) = Ib(H) + Iw(H) (2.15)
whereby; the between-group inequality is given by (2.14) into (2.15) and
rearranging:
Ib(H) = I(H)− Σt1m=1WmI(Hm) (2.16)
If α is the weight given to distances between SES at different parts of the
SES distribution,18 then;
Wm = Pm
[
µ(Hm)
µ(H)
]α
= RαmP
1−α
m (2.17)
where, Rm := P
µ(Hm)
µ(H) is subgroup m
′s share of the health variable; µ(Hm) is
the mean health variable for subgroup m; and µ(H) is the mean health variable
for the whole population.
Meanwhile, the inequality in Health can also be written as:
18α can take any value
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I(H) =
1
α2 − α
[∫ [
H
µ(H)
]α
dF (H)− 1
]
(2.18)
Then from equations (2.17) and (2.18), (2.14) becomes:
Iw(H) =
1
α2 − α
[
Σt1m=1Pm
[
µ(Hm)
µ(H)
]α ∫ [
Hm
µ(Hm)
]α
dF (Hm)− 1
]
(2.19)
then,
Ib(H) =
1
α2 − α
[
Σt1m=1Pm
[
µ(Hm)
µ(H)
]α
− 1
]
(2.20)
Now, using a sample of n under the assumption that OLS conditions are
satisfied, equation (2.13) can be estimated by dummies for different group iden-
tifications as:
hm = b0m + Σ
K
k=2bk,mxk,m + um (2.21)
where, b0,m represents the OLS estimates of β0,m + β1,mµ(x1,m) in sub-
sample m; so that µ(x1,m) is the corresponding mean of the variable x1, and
um is the OLS residual of each group.
Given the OLS estimate for the mean of hm as:
µ(hm) = bo,m + Σ
K
k=2bk,mµ(xk,m) (2.22)
the between-group inequality in health is:
Ib(h) =
1
α2 − α
[
Σt1m=1pm
[
b0,m + Σ
K
k=2bkµ(xk,m)
b0 + ΣKk=1bkµ(xk)
]α
− 1
]
(2.23)
where, nm is the size of subgroup m; and pm :=
nm
n is the population share.
The estimated within-group inequality in health (by substitution into (2.14) )
is given by:
Iw(h) = Σ
t1
m=1wmI(hm)
[
ΣKk=2
b2k,mσ
2(xk,m) + σ
2(um)
σ2(hm)
]
(2.24)
where, wm = (qm)
α(pm)
1−α is the weight expressed as a function of pm and
12
hm; and qm :=
pmµ(hm)
µ(h) is the health share of group m.
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Alternatively, the inequality in health for subgroup m can also be written
as:
I(hm) = Σ
K+1
k=1 Θm,k (2.25)
where, Θm,k is variable k
′s contribution to the overall inequality in health
for subgroup m. If the proportional contribution of variable k to inequality for
subgroup m is defined by θm,k :=
Θm,k
I(hm)
, then by substitution, the within-group
inequality can also be written as:
Iw(h) = Σ
t1
m=1wmΣ
K+1
k=1 Θm,k = Σ
t1
m=1wmΣ
K+1
k=1 I(hm)θm,k (2.26)
The “ineqrbd” command in STATA helps to compute equation (2.26) easily.
2.2.3 Measurement of variables
Dependent variables
In carrying out the above analysis, the main outcome variables are “health sta-
tus” of individuals, out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure for healthcare, and total
healthcare expenditures. The “health status” here is based on global indicators
for activities of daily living (ADLs). Characteristically, the indicators used for
health equity analysis can be categorised into medical, functional and subjec-
tive (Wagstaff et al., 1991). Therefore, the use of ADLs in the socio-economic
inequality in health analysis here in this study defines health in relation to in-
capability to carry out everyday tasks (O’Donnell et al., 2008). Specifically,
the ADLs are routine activities that people tend to do everyday and they are
indicators of independence and functional capabilities of an individual. These
are therefore key elements to measure quality of life and functional status of an
individual.
Unlike the self-assessed health which is typically derived from an ordered
response to a question evaluating one’s health status, the ADL used here is an
index constructed from a range of responses to health-related problems as pro-
vided by the data. The ADL-related questions in the survey include inter alia
ability to do rigorous activities,20 walking uphill, walking 100meters, walking
19Equation (2.24) is applicable when Corr(X1,m, Xk,m) = 0 and Corr(X1,m, U) = 0.
20such as running, lifting heavy object, participating in sports, doing hard labour, etc
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for at least 1km, bending over or stooping, difficulty in seeing, hearing, climb-
ing stairs or difficulty with self care.21 The response to each question is 1 if the
respondent can do the activity or 0 if (s)he is unable to do it. The nature of the
ADL-related questions makes it sensitive to many health problems (O’Donnell
et al., 2008) since these questions cut across ability or inability to do an ap-
preciable range of activities. This makes the use of ADL quite an informative
estimate about a person’s health status. Now, following Gertler and Gruber
(2002) and in accordance with other related literature, the responses are then
aggregated following an algorithm developed for the RAND Medical Outcome
Study (O’Donnell et al., 2008) so that in this study it is specified as:
ADLi =
11− Σ11a=1healthai
11
(2.27)
where healthai is the health status of individual i for the ath health item
which considers the ability do a specific routine activity. In all, there are eleven
of such health items in the data which means that the maximum aggregate
score an individual can obtain if (s)he can perform all activities without any
difficulty is eleven. Therefore, equation (2.27) represents the ADL-index used
in the analysis as a proxy for health status.22
The second dependent variable is total healthcare expenditure and this is
made up of consultation fee; medicine and drugs purchased over the counter,
from kiosk or Patent Medicine Vendors (PMV); and transportation (round trip)
purposely to the facility or the health practitioner for healthcare needs.23
The last dependent variable, out-of-pocket (OOP) healthcare expenditure
specifically looks at the amount of money that the respondent paid himself/herself
when (s)he sought treatment within the reference period.
Key independent variables
The main independent variable is the socio-economic status (standard of liv-
ing) and this is measured independently by households’ consumption, income
and wealth levels. The computation of the living standard is measured at the
household level because of the “sharing” and inter-dependence that take place
in a typical household in a developing economy.24
21such as bathing, dressing, feeding, toileting, etc.
22Note that the ADL index in this study is computed in a way that increase in good health.
23The reference period is 4 weeks preceding the survey.
24All measurements are adjusted to reflect a reference period of twelve months.
14
Consumption as a measure of socio-economic status, is made up of food,
non-food items, consumer durables and housing. The food consumption sub-
aggregate consists of food purchased in the market, food from home produc-
tion,25 food items received as gifts or remittances from other household(s) and
food received as in-kind payments from employers. The non-food sub-aggregate
is made up of education, health, clothing and footwear, toiletries, fuel and other
household items which are all converted to a uniform reference period of twelve
months. In the case of the consumption of durable goods, the focus here is to
compute the user cost of these goods. The survey provided information on the
current value and the age (in years) of each durable good owned by households.
Therefore, if T dit is the age of durable good d; of household i at time t, then for
N households, the average age for each durable good in the survey is given by:
T¯ =
ΣNd=1T
d
it
N
(2.28)
where; there are d = 1, ..., D durable goods. Now, following Deaton and
Zaidi (2002), the user cost (UC) of durable goods is computed by:
UCit =
StPt
2T¯ dt − T di,t
(2.29)
where; Pt is the price of the durable good at the beginning of the year; St is
the quantity owned by the household, so that StPt represents the current value
of that durable good(s); 2T¯ dt is the estimated average lifetime
26 of each item (d)
at time t; and 2T¯ dt − T dit is the remaining life of each item (d).
The last component of consumption, housing sub-aggregate is the monetary
measure of the flow of services that the household receives from occupying its
own dwelling (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002). Subsequently, the total consumption
derived from summing the various consumption components are adjusted to
reflect differences in prices using the Paasche price index. The final adjustment
was in relation to the household size in order to obtain per capita consumption
for each household.
The second SES measure is income. In order to obtain a good estimate
(given the challenge associated with collecting information on household in-
comes in surveys particularly in developing countries), income as used in the
analysis is made up of wage income from labour services, rental income from
25i.e. subsistence agriculture
26This is under the assumption that purchases are uniformly distributed through time
Deaton and Zaidi (2002).
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leasing assets,27 household agricultural income from the consumption of home-
grown agricultural produce, non-farm self employment income,28 income from
remittances and other income sources such as education scholarships and in-
vestment income.
Finally the socio-economic status is also measured by the household’s wealth.
Here, instead of creating an index out of the household’s ownership of durables
and housing characteristics (which is typically done in such studies), another
novelty of this analysis lies in the computation of the value of assets held by
households and the value of their dwellings (for owner-occupying dwellings).
The decision to use the value of wealth and not an index for wealth is because
the monetary measure of socio-economic status is noted to have the advantage
of clearer policy implications29(Howe, Hargreaves, Gabrysch, and Huttly, 2009).
Again, the motivation for using the value of wealth is to ensure a substantial
within-respondent variation in the variable of interest (wealth) in order to carry
on the study’s objectives.
Other independent variables
For the health status (ADL), it is anticipated that the quality of health will de-
cline as one advances in age and so, the respondent’s age (in completed years) is
controlled for in the regression models. If the deterioration of health status with
age holds, then healthcare expenditure is also expected to increase with age, all
things being equal. However, this may not always be the case given that some
ill health may not be anticipated and so people may make unexpected expendi-
tures on healthcare irrespective of their age. The inclusion of household size is
to adjust for differences in household decompositions. The respondent’s place
of residence (rural/urban) and wave (wave1/wave2) are included to account for
any community and/or time effect on health inequality.30 Nigeria is divided into
six (6) geo-political zones.31 Unfortunately areas within the north (particularly
north-east and north-west) have witnessed serious security problems in the form
of terrorism attacks at least in the last decade which have affected many facets
of life including health and standard of living. Therefore the zone of residence
is included in the empirical estimations to account for any differences among
27such as land, equipment, imputed rents for owner-occupying houses, etc.
28from other businesses excluding agricultural activities
29The information needed are all provided in the data.
30“Rural” and “wave1” are always used as the reference category for place of residence and
time (wave) respectively.
31These are north-central, north-east, north-west, south-east, south-south and south-west.
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the geo-political zones within the period under review.32
The multivariate regression models control for marital status as three-categorical
dummies (never married; married/union; and divorced/separated/widowed) and
the “never married” group is always used as the reference category. Finally, the
level of formal education is included to account for the influence of education
on health inequality. This is categorised into: “below/basic”,33 “secondary”,
“professional/diploma”, and “at least degree”; and here, the “below/basic ed-
ucation” group is always used as the reference category. As one climbs the
education ladder, (s)he is expected to make decisions that will improve his/her
health. The effect on healthcare expenditure may be ambiguous. On one hand,
healthcare expenditure may decrease if for instance education improves an in-
dividual’s lifestyle. On the other hand, it may be high given that the relatively
more educated will be more equipped in identifying any health changes and
thereby seek the appropriate healthcare regularly.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Source of data
The study uses the panel survey component of the General Household Survey
(GHS); which is a nationally representative household survey covering all the
thirty-six states and the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja) in Nigeria.34 The
survey was fielded by the country’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and
it is the first panel survey carried out by the institution. Based on the 2006
Housing and Population Census, a two-stage stratified sample selection process
was used to select the sample. The first stage involved the selection of the
primary sampling units (enumeration areas (EAs)) and these EAs were selected
based on probability proportional to size of the total EAs in each state and
Federal Capital Territory and the total households listed in those EAs, yielding
a total of 500 EAs. The second stage which was the selection of households was
carried out randomly using a systematic selection of ten (10) households from
each EA (NBS, 2013).
The main survey instruments were questionnaires. Currently, there are two
32North-central is always used as the reference category in the analysis.
33This is made up of those with no formal education, informal (adult and functional literacy)
programmes, and basic levels of education.
34The GHS in itself is a cross sectional survey of 22,000 households but a sub-sample of
5,000 households forms the panel component.
17
waves available; the first was conducted in 2010-2011 and the second was in
2012-2013.35 The GHS-panel is a multi-purpose survey that contains a wide
range of socio-economic topics. Each wave of the survey consists of two house-
hold questionnaires and one community questionnaire. While the first set of the
household questionnaire contains information such as demographics, education,
health, labour and time use, expenditures and consumption, safety nets and
information and communication technology, the second set is an agriculture
questionnaire administered only to households engaged in agricultural activi-
ties. The final set of questionnaire is the community questionnaire which was
administered to the community to collect information on the characteristics of
the EAs where the sampled households reside36(NBS, 2013).
The GHS is the result of partnership between Nigeria’s National Bureau of
Statistics, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the World Bank.37 Even
though 500 EAs made up of 5,000 households were selected, because households
were not selected using replacement and some challenges such as relocation
of and non-response by households, in all 4,851 households were successfully
interviewed in both post planting and post harvesting periods (NBS, 2013).
2.3.2 Description of variables
As noted earlier, the panel data consists of two waves. In carrying out this
analysis, the study uses respondents whose information are recorded in both
waves (balanced panel dataset). Therefore the summary statistics presented in
Table 2.1 first show the characteristics of each cross sectional dataset indepen-
dently; and those of the balanced panel data set which is eventually used in the
empirical estimations.
35Two visits were carried out in each wave. That is; August-October 2010 for post planting
and February-April 2011 for post harvesting in wave one. Similar time lines between 2012
and 2013 were also used to collect the wave two post planting and post harvesting data.
36The community questionnaire was very useful in computing the value of household con-
sumption since it contained the prices of food and non-food items.
37Due to the nature of the panel component, the partnership also involved the country’s Fed-
eral Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the National Food Reserve Agency.
18
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables
Variable Wave 1 Wave 2 Balanced panel
age 26.60 24.51 28.06
household size 7.04 5.67 6.43
Gender
male 49.50 49.87 49.99
female 50.50 50.13 50.01
Place of residence
rural 70.98 73.55 72.87
urban 29.02 26.45 27.13
Marital status
never married 56.68 63.30 54.24
married/union 39.13 32.19 41.15
divorced/widowed/sep. 4.19 4.51 4.61
Level of education
basic (maximum) 79.78 79.99 79.51
secondary 14.08 14.28 14.28
professional/diploma 3.30 3.18 3.33
at least degree 2.84 2.54 2.88
Zone of residence
north central 15.82 17.52 16.15
north east 20.24 20.56 20.52
north west 21.94 23.52 24.10
south east 15.78 13.34 15.74
south south 14.06 14.39 13.42
south west 12.16 10.67 10.07
log (consumption) 11.49 11.21 11.35
log (income) 10.64 10.59 10.61
log (wealth) 13.00 12.98 13.07
No. of obs. 15,914 25,005 26,654
Note that the balanced panel dataset is made up of 13,346 observations in each wave.
From Table 2.1, the average age of respondents (in completed years) in waves
1 and 2 independently are about 27 and 25 respectively; while in the balanced
panel, it is 28. The gender representation is almost balanced and respondents
are predominantly residing in the rural areas (more than 70 percent) in each
dataset. Majority of the respondents have either no or very low (basic) formal
education (nearly 80 percent). Only about 3 percent of the respondents have at
least bachelor degree level of education. On average, a household is made up of
about six members in both the second wave and the balanced panel datasets;
majority of the respondents have never married (54.24 percent in the balanced
panel), with about 5 percent being currently single either as result of divorce,
separation or death of the partner in the balanced panel dataset. Majority of
the respondents are residents from the north western and north eastern part of
the country; with the least representation being from the south western part.
Now, considering only the balance panel dataset, Table 2.2 provides detailed
summary statistics showing how the standard deviation of the time varying vari-
ables used in the empirical estimations decompose into “between” and “within”
variances. Given the argument made by the fixed effect vector decomposition
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(fevd) technique (see. Plumper and Troeger, 2007), this is particularly useful in
order to see which variables are rarely changing within the period considered
here in this study.
Table 2.2: Summary statistics of time-varying covariates
Variable Mean Std. Dev. btn./within ratio
age overall 28.06 18.88
between 18.63
within 3.12 5.97
household size overall 6.43 3.05
between 2.16
within 2.16 1.27
Marital status
never married overall 0.54 0.50
between 0.49
within 0.06 8.51
married/union overall 0.41 0.49
between 0.49
within 0.08 6.16
divorced/widowed/separated overall 0.05 0.21
between 0.20
within 0.07 2.81
Level of formal education
basic (maximum) overall 0.80 0.40
between 0.37
within 0.15 2.44
secondary overall 0.14 0.35
between 0.31
within 0.17 1.85
professional/diploma overall 0.03 0.18
between 0.16
within 0.09 1.76
at least degree overall 0.03 0.17
between 0.15
within 0.07 2.15
log (consumption) overall 11.35 1.12
between 0.94
within 0.61 1.53
log (income) overall 10.61 1.61
between 1.32
within 0.93 1.42
log (wealth) overall 13.07 1.98
between 1.73
within 0.97 1.78
Column 5 is the ratio of “between” to “within” variance for each variable.
From Table 2.2, although the “between” variances are relatively larger than
the “within” variances, this is only marginal for most variables. However, the
difference is quite appreciable for the variables: age and marital status. Re-
call that the main variable of interest in this study is the socio-economic status
(consumption, income and wealth). From Table 2.2, the “between to within”
variance ratios for these SES variables are not very high compared to the 2.8-
threshold suggested by Plumper and Troeger (2007) in order for us to be wor-
ried. Nonetheless, considering the “between to within” variance ratios and the
threshold suggested by Plumper and Troeger (2007), the fevd analyses consider
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age and marital status as the rarely changing covariates.
Now, with respect to the study’s objectives, the focus here is not in the level
of a person’s socio-economic status but rather, his or her relative rank with
respect to that specific SES measure. Therefore, Table 2.3 specifically provides
the detailed summary statistics for the respective SES rank.
Table 2.3: Summary statistics of socio-economic status (SES) rank
Variable Mean Std. Dev. btn./within ratio
consumption rank overall 0.5 0.29
between 0.25
within 0.15 1.69
income rank overall 0.5 0.29
between 0.24
within 0.16 1.45
wealth rank overall 0.5 0.28
between 0.24
within 0.14 1.76
Column 5 shows the “between” to “within” variance ratio for each variable.
Here again, the “between to within” variance ratios are not very high. How-
ever, as shall be presented later, we use the fevd model, taking into account
the variables: age and marital status as the rarely changing covariates based on
their relatively higher “between to within” variance ratios.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 SES inequality in health by wave
Extent and trend in socio-economic health inequality
This section estimates the extent and trend in SES health inequality for the
period under review. Therefore Table 2.4 presents the health concentration
indices which measure the SES inequality in health by estimating equation (2.6)
for each cross section of the datasets.38
38Recall that estimating model (2.6) gives the health concentration index which measures
the SES-related inequality in health. All standard errors are robust standard errors.
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Table 2.4: SES inequality in health by wave (from model 2.6)
Consumption Income Wealth
Wave 1 (2012/2013)
ADL index 0.0019*** 0.0027*** 0.0016***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Total health exp. 0.2738*** 0.1819** 0.2689***
(0.0894) (0.0776) (0.0898)
OOP health exp. 0.2898*** 0.2626*** 0.2644***
(0.0556) (0.0490) (0.0596)
Wave 2 (2012/2013)
ADL index 0.0029*** 0.0031*** 0.0040***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Total health exp. 0.1860*** 0.0999*** 0.1234***
(0.0302) (0.0296) (0.0235)
OOP health exp. 0.3033*** 0.2890*** 0.2390***
(0.0404) (0.0420) (0.0386)
Inference: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05; and ∗p < 0.1.
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
Clearly from Table 2.4, health inequality in Nigeria is concentrated among
the rich regardless of the SES indicator and the health variable under consid-
eration. This is indicated by the positive values of all the concentration indices
during the period under review.39 A positive concentration index for health
expenditure implies healthcare payment is progressive. Generally from the re-
sults, the implication is that, for each period (wave), the higher the rank of
the respondent in the specific SES distribution, the better the health status or
the higher the healthcare expenditure incurred. Nonetheless the SES inequality
in health is comparatively higher with respect to healthcare expenditure than
health status (ADL). Also, comparing the two waves, SES inequality in health
status (ADL) and out-of-pocket (OOP) healthcare expenditure have generally
been rising (though marginally) with respect to the SES indicators.40
2.4.2 SES inequality in health using the panel data
Estimation of models (2.6) and (2.9)
Unlike the output in Table 2.4, this section presents the results obtained from
estimating the simple OLS and FE models specified in (2.6) and (2.9) respec-
tively; and independently for each of the three health-related variables consid-
39Note that model (2.6) is a simple OLS regression that neither controls for other covariates
nor individual heterogeneities but only for the respondent’s “rank” on the SES distribution.
40except for wealth as an SES-measure in the case of OOP
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ered. These are carried out using the balanced panel data and for each SES
indicator. The results are shown in Table 2.5. This therefore provides the ex-
tent to which inequalities in health are systematically related to socio-economic
status; a major objective of this study.
Table 2.5: SES and health inequality from models (2.6) and (2.9)
OLS regression
ADLs Total health exp. OOP. Health exp.
SES rank Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
consumption 0.0012*** 0.0003 0.2738*** 0.0385 0.2954*** 0.0425
income 0.0014*** 0.0004 0.2509*** 0.0318 0.2797*** 0.0349
wealth 0.0007* 0.0004 0.1522*** 0.0338 0.1636*** 0.0369
No. of obs. 26,260 26,554 25,908
Fixed Effect Model
ADLs Total health exp. OOP. Health exp.
SES rank Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
consumption -0.0005 0.0006 0.0180 0.0359 0.0289 0.0384
income -0.00003 0.0005 0.0143 0.0284 0.0148 0.0319
wealth 0.0017*** 0.0006 -0.0328 0.0430 -0.0085 0.0499
No. of obs. 26,260 26,554 25,908
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05; and ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors are robust standard errors.
The OLS results in Table 2.5 support the widely-cited relationship between
socio-economic status (SES) and health inequality. That is, inequality in socio-
economic status affects disparities in health status and expenditure on health.
These are statistically significant at almost all the conventional levels. This
means that inequality in health using each SES measure (consumption, income
and wealth) is concentrated among the rich, again suggesting that the rich spend
relatively more on health;41 and also have relatively better health in Nigeria.
However, the FE results at this level of analysis generally contrast the OLS
findings since out of the nine models, only one of the SES ranks (wealth) is
statistically significant in explaining inequality in health status.42
Estimation of models (2.8) and (2.10)
Similarly, this section estimates models (2.8) and (2.10) independently for each
health-related variable and each SES indicator. Note that here, each model
adjusts for other covariates and model (2.10) further accounts for unmeasured
heterogeneities in the regression. The results in Table 2.6 shows the SES inequal-
ity in health when consumption is used as the SES measure for the respondent.
41Whether in relation to out-of-pocket or total healthcare expenditure.
42Note that each SES rank is used in estimating three independent models (ADL, OOP
and total health expenditure) and here, only the variable “wealth rank” in the ADL model is
significant.
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Tables 2.7 and 2.8 provide similar analyses using wealth and income as the SES
measures.
Table 2.6: Consumption and health inequality from models (2.8) and (2.10)
ADL Total health exp. OOP health exp.
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Variable Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
consumption rank 0.0010*** 0.0011* 0.1432*** 0.0376 0.1435*** 0.0452
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0284) (0.0312) (0.0306) (0.0330)
1.wave 0.0022*** 0.0020*** 0.0209 0.0324 0.0169 0.0319
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0198) (0.0269) (0.0212) (0.0298)
age 0.0006*** 0.0002** -0.0051** -0.0008 -0.0044* -0.0056
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0022) (0.0036) (0.0023) (0.0042)
age squared 0.0000*** -0.0000** 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0001*** 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Gender
1.male 0.0015*** 0.0565*** 0.0935
(0.0002) (0.0170) (0.0188)
Level of education
1.secondary -0.0005** -0.0006 0.0158 -0.1644* 0.0323 -0.1712
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0283) (0.0919) (0.0320) (0.1088)
2.professional/diploma -0.0009 -0.0006 0.0759 -0.1998* 0.0640 -0.2560*
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0599) (0.1135) (0.0528) (0.1406)
3.at least degree 0.0005 -0.0007 0.2709* -0.3680 0.3654 -0.2689
(0.0005) (0.0011) (0.1565) (0.2465) (0.1811) (0.2977)
Marital status
1.married -0.0001 -0.0039* 0.1685*** 0.0063 0.1793 0.0576
(0.0003) (0.0021) (0.0247) (0.0643) (0.0266) (0.0544)
2.divorced/widowed/sep. -0.0048*** -0.0047* 0.1378** 0.0715 0.1749 0.0846
(0.0009) (0.0025) (0.0549) (0.0753) (0.0591) (0.0724)
Place of residence
1.urban -0.0005* -0.0060 -0.0004
(0.0002) (0.0221) (0.0243)
Zone of residence
1.north east -0.0017*** -0.0210 -0.0214 -
(0.0003) (0.0286) (0.0295)
2.north west -0.0021*** -0.0667*** -0.0584
(0.0003) (0.0255) (0.0278)
3.south east 0.0002 0.1363*** 0.1291
(0.0003) (0.0490) (0.0524)
4.south south 0.0005 0.1476*** 0.1605
(0.0003) (0.0405) (0.0441)
5.south west 0.0001 0.0666 0.0843
(0.0004) (0.0500) (0.0543)
household size 0.0001* 0.0000 0.0057 0.0069 0.0045 0.0062
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0039) (0.0049) (0.0040) (0.0053)
cons 0.1607*** 0.1651*** -0.0837 0.1640** -0.1191 0.1943***
(0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0586) (0.0636) (0.0614) (0.0653)
No. Of obs. 25,892 26,178 25,547
Inference: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05; and ∗p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses
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Table 2.7: Wealth and health inequality from models (2.8) and (2.10)
ADL Total health exp. OOP health exp.
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Variable Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
wealth rank 0.0006* 0.0012** 0.0936*** -0.0239 0.1023*** 0.0006
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0306) (0.0420) (0.0336) (0.0485)
1.wave 0.0021*** 0.0019*** 0.0076 0.0295 0.0036 0.0279
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0204) (0.0267) (0.0218) (0.0294)
age 0.0006*** 0.0002** -0.0052** -0.0007 -0.0045* -0.0055
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0022) (0.0036) (0.0023) (0.0042)
age squared -0.0000*** -0.0000** 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0001*** 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Gender
1.male 0.0015*** 0.0575*** 0.0948***
(0.0002) (0.0171) (0.0190)
Level of education
1.secondary -0.0005* -0.0006 0.0245 -0.1649* 0.0408 -0.1718*
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0292) (0.0919) (0.0332) (0.10874)
2.professional/diploma -0.0008 -0.0006 0.0903 -0.1994* 0.0776 -0.2561
(0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0602) (0.1136) (0.0531) (0.1407)
3.at least degree 0.0006 -0.0007 0.2894* -0.3677 0.3824** -0.2689
(0.0005) (0.0011) (0.1583) (0.2466) (0.1831) (0.2978)
Marital status
1.married 0.0000 -0.0040* 0.1741*** 0.0068 0.1862*** 0.0566
(0.0003) (0.0021) (0.0252) (0.0642) (0.0272) (0.0544)
2.divorced/widowed/sep. -0.0047*** -0.0048* 0.1530*** 0.0702 0.1920*** 0.0825
(0.0009) (0.0025) (0.0537) (0.0752) (0.0582) (0.0724)
Place of residence
1.urban -0.0004 0.0108 0.0161
(0.0002) (0.0220) (0.0241)
Zone of residence
1.north east -0.0019*** -0.0480 -0.0493*
(0.0003) (0.0293) (0.0299)
2.north west -0.0022*** -0.0860*** -0.0781***
(0.0003) (0.0261) (0.0284)
3.south east 0.0001 0.1317*** 0.1238**
(0.0003) (0.0487) (0.0521)
4.south south 0.0005 0.1438*** 0.1559***
(0.0003) (0.0400) (0.0435)
5.south west 0.0002 0.0737 0.0914*
(0.0004) (0.0504) (0.0548)
household size 0.0001* 0.0000 0.0045 0.0064 0.0033 0.0056
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0039) (0.0049) (0.0040) (0.0052)
cons 0.1610*** 0.1652*** -0.0449 0.1967*** -0.0838 0.2200***
(0.0006) (0.0016) (0.0628) (0.0668) (0.0659) (0.0706)
No. Of obs. 25,892 26,178 25,547
Inference: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05; and ∗p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses
25
Table 2.8: Income and health inequality from models (2.8) and (2.10)
ADL Total health exp. OOP health exp.
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Variable Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
income rank 0.0008** 0.0004 0.1031*** 0.0161 0.1142*** 0.0134
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0246) (0.0288) (0.0257) (0.0320)
1.wave 0.0021*** 0.0019*** 0.0102 0.0293 0.0061 0.0281
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0204) (0.0269) (0.0217) (0.0297)
age 0.0006*** 0.0002** -0.0049** -0.0007 -0.0042* -0.0055
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0022) (0.0036) (0.0023) (0.0042)
age squared 0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0001*** 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Gender
1.male 0.0015*** 0.0549*** 0.0920***
(0.0002) (0.0170) (0.0187)
Level of education
1.secondary -0.0005** -0.0006 0.0214 -0.1650* 0.0371 -0.1718
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0288) (0.0919) (0.0327) (0.1088)
2.professional/diploma -0.0008 -0.0006 0.0861 -0.2003* 0.0724 -0.2566*
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0596) (0.1135) (0.0526) (0.1405)
3.at least degree 0.0006 -0.0008 0.2848* -0.3688 0.3774** -0.2695
(0.0005) (0.0011) (0.1572) (0.2465) (0.1819) (0.2977)
Marital status
1.married -0.0001 -0.0039* 0.1623*** 0.0051 0.1728*** 0.0561
(0.0003) (0.0021) (0.0243) (0.0642) (0.0261) (0.0544)
2.divorced/widowed/sep. -0.0048*** -0.0048* 0.1334** 0.0701 0.1702*** 0.0826
(0.0009) (0.0025) (0.0550) (0.0753) (0.0591) (0.0723)
Place of residence
1.urban -0.0004 0.0062 0.0111
(0.0002) (0.0216) (0.0237)
Zone of residence
1.north east -0.0019*** -0.0444 -0.0446
(0.0003) (0.0291) (0.0297)
2.north west -0.0022*** -0.0829*** -0.0743***
(0.0003) (0.0259) (0.0281)
3.south east 0.0001 0.1226** 0.1138**
(0.0003) (0.0500) (0.0535)
4.south south 0.0004 0.1318*** 0.1421***
(0.0003) (0.0409) (0.0445)
5.south west 0.0000 0.0525 0.0682
(0.0004) (0.0505) (0.0547)
household size 0.0001* 0.0000 0.0045 0.0064 0.0033 0.0056
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0039) (0.0049) (0.0040) (0.0052)
cons 0.1609*** 0.1656*** -0.0433 0.1776*** -0.0828 0.2140***
(0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0596) (0.0635) (0.0610) (0.0668)
No. Of obs. 25,892 26,178 25,547
Inference: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05; and ∗p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses
Again in the OLS models, the SES indicators maintained their statistical
significance (regardless of the choice of SES indicator) as presented in Tables
2.6 to 2.8. However, all the SES-health inequality coefficients shrank. Well,
this decline in the size of the SES inequality effect on health inequality may be
an indication that earlier bivariate analyses may have generated some form of
biased estimates. Nevertheless, the results from estimating equation (2.8) also
support the SES inequality in health hypothesis but this effect may have been
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overstated in instances where other observable characteristics have not been
accounted for.
Once again in the FE models, the coefficients of the SES indicators fail to
reach statistical significance in seven out of the nine models. Here again, the
results suggest that unmeasured heterogeneity among respondents matters in
the analyses of inequalities in socio-economic status and inequality in health.
The results from using the fevd estimation technique are basically not very
different from those obtained from the FE model (see Appendix for the fevd
output). As indicated earlier, under the fevd model, we are also able to estimate
the coefficients of the time-invariant variables. As expected, there are some
changes in the regression coefficients of the rarely changing variables; but these
are only marginal because the differences between the “within” and “between”
variances were not very appreciable. Nevertheless since in this study, the interest
is in estimating the SES-inequality in health, it is worth noting that this remains
unchanged since they were not considered as rarely changing variables based on
their “between to within” variance ratios.
Thus comparing the socio-economic status in terms of the three measure-
ments reveals that relative consumption and wealth levels have significant ef-
fect on inequality in health status in Nigeria.43 However, inequality in socio-
economic status has no statistically significant effect on inequality in healthcare
expenditure (see Tables 2.6 to 2.8).44 This revelation is important for policy
purposes.
2.4.3 Decomposition of health inequality
Here in the analysis, the interest is in decomposing the within-group inequality
in health by gender, level of formal education and place of residence. Decom-
posing health inequality by gender is important given that men and women
may have some innate characteristics that may influence their health status and
hence their contribution to health inequality differently. Regards education, the
effect of formal education on health is well documented in the literature; whereby
all things being equal, acquiring formal education is expected to influence an
individual’s health positively (see for example: Huang, 2015; Cutler, Huang, and
Lleras-Muney, 2014; Ross and Wu, 1995). This may have some effect on health
inequality. Lastly, residing in a rural or an urban area in a developing country
43see ADL output in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. Recall that health status is measured by ADL
index. This suggests that, SES inequality in health matters in terms of health status.
44for OOP and total health expenditure FE output.
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such as Nigeria may come with its own challenges given that there is a vast
difference between these localities, for example in terms of infrastructure and
economic opportunities which may subsequently affect their livelihoods and/or
health.45 It is therefore insightful to find out the extent to which the place of
residence accounts for the inequalities in health.
Since the earlier analyses revealed consumption and wealth inequalities to
be statistically significant in explaining inequality in health status (ADL) even
in the multivariate FE models, this section aims to provides an insight into
the inequalities that generate the inequalities in ADL by providing the within-
group differences in the contribution to inequality in health status. Therefore
from equation (2.26), hm is a vector of individual health status in group m and
the covariates used are SES rank (consumption and wealth independently), age,
marital status (three category dummies), household size, place of residence and
four category dummies for the level of education.
The estimation of equation (2.26) uses the “fields” option so that the health
inequality decompositions reported in this section give the regression-based de-
composition in the predicted SES health status inequality.46 Tables 2.9 and
2.10 present the decomposition by gender. Note that in Table 2.9, the SES in-
dicator of respondents is their “consumption rank” while Table 2.10 uses their
respective “wealth rank”.
Table 2.9: Within-group inequality in health status using decomposition by gender
Male Female
Variable 2011 2013 2011 2013
consumption rank 0.0692 0.0834 0.0669 0.0775
age 0.0297 0.0497 0.0252 0.0357
secondary 0.0031 0.0034 0.0034 0.0027
professional/diploma -0.0003 0.0006 0.0003 -0.0003
at least degree -0.0003 -0.0011 0.0005 -0.0002
married/union -0.0087 -0.0150 -0.0046 0.0001
divorced/widowed/sep. 0.0001 0.0001 0.0031 0.0011
rural 0.0482 0.0831 0.0510 0.0810
household size 0.0965 0.0653 0.0906 0.0666
Total 0.2375 0.2694 0.2363 0.2643
45For instance, the rural areas may be disadvantaged when it comes to provision of good
infrastructure and other basic facilities such as potable drinking water. On the other hand,
the urban areas also suffer from congestion and pollution of all kinds.
46The 1st and 2nd waves are referred to as “2011” and “2013” for simplification purposes.
Note that all Tables for the subgroup decomposition report only the output for equation (2.26)
which is the product of the factor (variable) source decomposition of equality in each group
I(hm) and its weight (wm).
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Table 2.10: Within-group inequality in health status using decomposition by gender
Male Female
Variable 2011 2013 2011 2013
wealth rank 0.0608 0.0803 0.0583 0.0755
age 0.0455 0.0540 0.0386 0.0426
secondary 0.0064 0.0072 0.0065 0.0058
professional/diploma 0.0004 0.0014 0.0010 0.0007
at least degree 0.0006 0.0003 0.0010 0.0006
married/union -0.0131 -0.0124 -0.0076 0.0028
divorced/widowed/sep. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0021 0.0004
rural 0.0485 0.0732 0.0499 0.0706
household size 0.1172 0.0802 0.1075 0.0784
Total 0.2664 0.2842 0.2573 0.2775
Generally, the results in Tables 2.9 and 2.10 do not vary much in terms of
the trend in contributions from the various variables to health status inequality.
Table 2.9 shows SES (consumption rank) to account for relatively large share
to within-group health inequality for both men and women. There appears to
be an increasing trend (quite substantial) in the SES’s contribution to health
inequality for both sexes regardless of the choice of SES indicator (see Tables 2.9
and 2.10) in Nigeria. Residing in a rural area and household size also account
for appreciable contributions to health inequality for both males and females in
Nigeria.
The results for the decomposition by the level of education are presented in
Tables 2.11 and 2.12 for each SES indicator as before. These show the largest
contributors to within-group inequality in health status (ADL) to be household
size, SES rank (consumption or wealth), and age. In Table 2.11; where individ-
uals are ranked by their consumption levels, SES rank generally has the highest
contribution to health status inequality among those with relatively higher edu-
cation level (i.e. professional/diploma and at least degree holders). The output
in Table 2.12, whereby individuals are ranked by their level of wealth produces
similar results except that SES (wealth) rank shows an increasing trend regards
its contribution to inequality in health status between 2011 and 2013 among
almost all levels (except for those with at least degree) of education. The in-
dividual’s marital status either reduces (married/union group) or has relatively
little contribution (divorced/widowed/separated group) to inequality in health
status. While residing in a rural area has an appreciable contribution (i.e. in
terms of magnitude of coefficient) to health status inequality among those with
relatively low education (basic and secondary levels); this is not the case among
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those with relatively higher level of education (see Tables 2.11 and 2.12).
Table 2.11: Within-group inequality in health status using decomposition by level of educ.
Educational level
Variable basic/below sec. prof./dipl. degree+
2011
consumption rank 0.0558 0.0598 0.0667 0.0934
age 0.0225 0.0804 0.0514 0.0276
female 0.0135 0.0102 0.0143 0.0096
married/union -0.0099 -0.0150 -0.0036 -0.0016
divorced/widowed/sep. 0.0035 -0.0004 0.0018 0.0002
rural 0.0542 0.0158 0.0046 0.0088
household size 0.0899 0.0511 0.0578 0.0314
Total 0.2295 0.2020 0.1929 0.1695
2013
consumption rank 0.0651 0.0631 0.0738 0.0780
age 0.0321 0.1024 0.0981 0.0639
female 0.0211 0.0132 0.0056 0.0082
married/union -0.0111 -0.0172 -0.0171 -0.0142
divorced/widowed/sep. 0.0020 -0.0011 -0.0006 0.0000
rural 0.0888 0.0271 0.0164 0.0113
household size 0.0590 0.0359 0.0392 0.0334
Total 0.2570 0.2234 0.2153 0.1807
Table 2.12: Within-group inequality in health status using decomposition by level of educ.
Educational level
Variable basic/below sec. prof./dipl. degree+
2011
wealth rank 0.0528 0.0322 0.0383 0.0452
age 0.0340 0.1231 0.0838 0.0922
female 0.0184 0.0166 0.0213 0.0178
married/union -0.0147 -0.0208 -0.0116 -0.0080
divorced/widowed/sep. 0.0027 -0.0007 0.0016 -0.0002
rural 0.0536 0.0106 0.0030 0.0109
household size 0.1031 0.0645 0.0780 0.0583
Total 0.2499 0.2256 0.2146 0.2161
2013
wealth rank 0.0704 0.0411 0.0481 0.0444
age 0.0368 0.1331 0.1264 0.0998
female 0.0237 0.0174 0.0125 0.0125
married/union -0.0107 -0.0190 -0.0149 -0.0159
divorced/widowed/sep. 0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0004
rural 0.0782 0.0200 0.0108 0.0083
household size 0.0679 0.0499 0.0511 0.0532
Total 0.2676 0.2413 0.2327 0.2019
Regards the decomposition by place of residence, Tables 2.13 and 2.14 also
show the SES rank, household size and age to account for relatively larger con-
tribution to within-group health inequality in both localities in Nigeria. While
household size’s contribution to health inequality shows a declining trend (be-
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tween 2011 and 2013), there appears to be an increasing trend in the contri-
bution of differences in socio-economic status (SES) to inequality in health for
both the rural and urban areas within the period; with relatively higher shares
in the urban areas. An observation of concern is the fact that being a female
shows a rising trend in the contribution to health status inequality particularly
in the rural areas regardless of the SES indicator in Nigeria (see Tables 2.13 and
2.14).47
Table 2.13: Within-group ineq. in health status using decomposition by place of residence
Rural Urban
Variable 2011 2013 2011 2013
consumption rank 0.0553 0.0761 0.1181 0.1283
age 0.0476 0.1078 0.0355 0.0532
female 0.0219 0.0468 0.0135 0.0190
secondary 0.0020 0.0017 0.0029 0.0035
professional/diploma -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0007
at least degree -0.0001 -0.0010 -0.0015 -0.0038
married/union -0.0167 -0.0274 -0.0103 -0.0123
divorced/widowed/sep. 0.0015 -0.0030 0.0031 0.0018
household size 0.1490 0.1317 0.0836 0.0806
Total 0.2601 0.3322 0.2442 0.2696
Table 2.14: Within-group ineq. in health status using decomposition by place of residence
Rural Urban
Variable 2011 2013 2011 2013
wealth rank 0.0637 0.1079 0.0628 0.0770
age 0.0452 0.0759 0.0839 0.0822
female 0.0211 0.0363 0.0307 0.0292
secondary 0.0024 0.0020 0.0131 0.0125
professional/diploma -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0009 0.0017
at least degree 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0008 -0.0009
married/union -0.0155 -0.0143 -0.0221 -0.0161
divorced/widowed/sep. 0.0013 -0.0013 0.0016 0.0004
household size 0.1398 0.1052 0.1324 0.1160
Total 0.2579 0.3108 0.3041 0.3021
2.5 Discussion
The rising inequality and poor health outcomes in Nigeria is undoubtedly a
matter of concern which obviously needs to be addressed in order to unravel
47i.e. whether socio-economic status is measured by consumption or wealth.
31
any relationship. There are empirical studies that link the differences in health
to differences in socio-economic status (see. Ben-Shlomo et al., 1996; Kaplan
et al., 1996; Kawachi and Kennedy, 1997; Kennedy et al., 1998; Shibuya et al.,
2002; Wagstaff, 2005; Wagstaff et al., 2003). Nonetheless, commonly-cited ev-
idence for SES health inequality comes from studies based on cross-sectional
data analysis (see. Shibuya et al., 2002; Wagstaff et al., 2003; Sturm and Gre-
senz, 2002; Wagstaff, 2005) whose parameter estimates may have been biased
by their inability to account for unobserved heterogeneity among respondents.
This set-back is among the concerns, motivating this study.
While acknowledging the data constraints for this study,48 to a greater ex-
tent, the study’s choice of SES measures (consumption, wealth and income lev-
els) ensures some substantial variability in the SES among respondents so that
the FE model is used. For instance, one source of variation in consumption or
income levels may come from home production (subsistence agriculture) which
is a major source of livelihood in Nigeria. This type of agriculture is mostly
rain-fed and besides, prices for these produce are highly unpredictable thereby
generating some reasonable variations in living standard levels. Also, as already
mentioned, unlike the wealth index, the use of wealth level here in this study
ensures some form of variations between respondents. Therefore, by running
FE models, the threat of omitted variables is reduced significantly. Nonethe-
less, it is still important to note that the inferences from this study are made
cautiously. In this regard, this study makes two main observations and the ro-
bustness of the findings lies in the fact that the study independently uses three
different SES indicators (consumption, income and wealth levels) and three dif-
ferent health-related variables (health status, out-of-pocket (OOP) healthcare
expenditure and total expenditure on health). This therefore can be seen as
a valuable contribution to the literature on SES health inequality hypothesis
particularly from a developing country perspective.
The first observation is that, after accounting for unobserved heterogeneity
among individuals in the FE models, the SES inequality in health hypothe-
sis does not hold with respect to healthcare expenditure.49 In other words,
the significance of inequality in the SES indicator in explaining inequality in
healthcare expenditure evident in the OLS regressions disappears in the cor-
responding FE models; regardless of the choice of SES indicator. This is an
indication that interpretations of socio-economic inequality in healthcare ex-
48That is, the availability of only two waves of the data.
49whether out-of-pocket or total healthcare expenditure.
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penditure from simple cross-sectional data analysis should be carefully made.
A possible implication from this finding is that identifying the disadvantaged in-
dividuals or households by their level of consumption, income or wealth under a
policy aimed at reducing inequality in healthcare expenditure may not yield the
desired outcome in Nigeria. However, the generally positive concentration in-
dex for the health expenditure observed regardless of the choice of SES measure
means that healthcare expenditure or payment is progressive in Nigeria.
The second observation is that, in terms of SES inequality in health, rela-
tive consumption and wealth do matter regards inequality in health status or
quality of life among Nigerians. That is, the socio-economic status; measured
independently by consumption and wealth remains statistically significant in
explaining inequality in health status (ADL) even after accounting for unob-
served heterogeneity. Given that most social protection policies in developing
economies are rolled-out on a “piece-meal” basis, this finding suggests that;
for an effective “piece-meal” policy targeting the health of the poor, such in-
dividuals or households must be identified using their relative consumption or
wealth levels and not their relative income levels. In this case, an increase in
the relative consumption or wealth of such individuals or households may lead
to an improvement in their health status which may subsequently reduce health
inequality resulting from differences in living standards. Therefore the prelimi-
nary findings from this study should stimulate empirical works particularly for
developing countries where enough panel dataset at the individual-level exists.
Meanwhile, the decomposition of SES inequality in health status shows that
reducing inequality in health status is not a simple case of redistributing con-
sumption or wealth but other variables such as age, residing in a rural area and
household size have appreciable contributions to socio-economic inequality in
health status.50 Well, even though the study attempts to provide some insight
into the within-group differences in health inequality decomposition, the use of
a single equation makes the analysis quite descriptive (Cowell and Fiorio, 2011).
Nevertheless, it is important to recall that the analysis of the SES health in-
equality carried out earlier in the chapter uses both bivariate and multivariate
FE models in addition to the standard OLS models in order to minimise the
biases on the estimates. Once again, it is acknowledged that any inference(s)
here must be made cautiously.51
50see Tables 2.9 to 2.14.
51given that any structural model approach for inequality analysis may come with a cost
such as being sensitive to model specification (Cowell and Fiorio, 2011).
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2.6 Conclusion
The major concern raised at the beginning of this chapter was to find out
if the rising inequality in Nigeria plays any significant role in the prevailing
health disparities and if this SES inequality in health hypothesis still holds in
a model that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity. This was based on the
fact that most empirical evidence on SES inequality in health have either relied
on cross-sectional data for one country or cross-national analysis. Also there
has been some debate on the choice of living standard measure (SES indicator)
particularly for developing economies where quality data is scarce. In addition,
there has been doubts about empirical findings on this hypothesis conducted at
the aggregate level, thereby informing an individual-level analysis. Now given
Nigeria’s systematic structure of inequality, unimpressive health indicators and
the burden of high healthcare expenditure, this chapter sought to contribute to
the literature on socio-economic status and health inequality by using models
that adjust for unmeasured heterogeneity among individuals and considering
health-related variables that have not received relatively much attention in this
area of research.
Generally, the study fails to find a statistically significant relationship be-
tween SES inequality and inequality in healthcare expenditure. This finding
holds for all three indicators of socio-economic status (consumption, income
and wealth) used in the analysis; suggesting that any unmeasured heterogene-
ity in such empirical analysis may bias the outcome(s). However, there appears
to be a statistically significant effect of consumption and wealth inequality on
inequality in health status.52 While the differences in socio-economic status
(consumption and wealth) have significant effect on inequality in health status,
the health status inequality decomposition also shows that age, household size,
and place of residence (rural/urban) have appreciable contribution to health
inequality. The findings in this chapter are signals for where policy makers in
Nigeria could direct effort and resources to; in order to reduce any SES-related
inequality in health status.
52The health status is measured by an individual’s ability to perform routine activities (i.e.
activities of daily living index).
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Appendix: Results from using fevd technique53
Appendix 1: Consumption and health inequality from model (2.11)
ADL Total health exp. OOP health exp.
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
consumption rank 0.0011*** 0.0003 0.0376 0.0343 0.0452 0.0382
1.wave 0.0020*** 0.0002 0.0324* 0.0179 0.0319 0.0199
age 0.0006*** 0.0000 0.0073*** 0.0024 0.0012 0.0027
age−squared -0.0000*** 0.0000 -0.0000* 0.0000 0.0001* 0.0000
Gender
1.male 0.0015*** 0.0002 0.0740*** 0.0177 0.1128*** 0.0197
Level of education
1.secondary -0.0006** 0.0003 -0.1644*** 0.0267 -0.1712*** 0.0298
2.professional/diploma -0.0006 0.0005 -0.1998*** 0.0487 -0.2560*** 0.0543
3.at least degree -0.0007 0.0005 -0.3680*** 0.0532 -0.2689*** 0.0591
Marital status
1.married -0.0001 0.0003 0.0824** 0.0339 0.1446*** 0.0378
2.divorced/widowed/sep. -0.0048*** 0.0005 0.0334 0.0565 0.0887 0.0630
Place of residence
1.urban -0.0005** 0.0002 0.0593*** 0.0213 0.0716*** 0.0238
Zone of residence
1.north east -0.0021*** 0.0003 -0.0494 0.0322 -0.0494 0.0363
2.north west -0.0021*** 0.0003 -0.0983*** 0.0276 -0.0940*** 0.0307
3.south east 0.0000 0.0003 0.1534*** 0.0313 0.1508*** 0.0347
4.south south 0.0004 0.0003 0.1767*** 0.0313 0.1973*** 0.0348
5.south west -0.0003 0.0004 0.0915** 0.0393 0.1119** 0.0437
household size -0.00001 0.0000 0.0069* 0.0035 0.0062 0.0039
eta 1.0000*** 0.0068 1.0000*** 0.0083 1.0000*** 0.0087
cons 0.1614*** 0.0005 -0.1730*** 0.0524 -0.1396** 0.0584
No. Of obs. 25,892 26,178 25,547
Inference: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05; and ∗p < 0.1.
53Note that η in the output is the part of the individual effect that is neither explained
by the time-invariant nor rarely changing variable(s) and its coefficient is either equal to 1 or
close to 1 (by accounting for serial correlation) in the stage three(3) of the fevd estimation
process (Plumper and Troeger).
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Appendix 2: Wealth and health inequality from model (2.11)
ADL Total health exp. OOP health exp.
Variable Coeff. Std Err. Coeff. Std Err. Coeff. Std Err.
wealth rank 0.0012*** 0.0003 -0.0239 0.0312 0.0006 0.0348
1.wave 0.0019*** 0.0002 0.0295* 0.0177 0.0279 0.0197
age -0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0075*** 0.0024 0.0013 0.0027
age−squared 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001* 0.0000
Gender
1.male 0.0016*** 0.0002 0.0732*** 0.0177 0.1126*** 0.0197
Level of education
1.secondary -0.0006** 0.0003 -0.1650*** 0.0266 -0.1718*** 0.0296
2.professional/diploma -0.0006 0.0005 -0.1994*** 0.0484 -0.2561*** 0.0540
3.at least degree -0.0007 0.0005 -0.3677*** 0.0528 -0.2689*** 0.0587
Marital status
1.married 0.0052*** 0.0003 0.0780** 0.0341 0.1427*** 0.0380
2.divorced/widowed/sep. -0.0024*** 0.0005 0.0254 0.0569 0.0858 0.0634
Place of residence
1.urban 0.0001 0.0002 0.0673*** 0.0208 0.0795*** 0.0231
Zone of residence
1.north east -0.0024*** 0.0003 -0.0576* 0.0315 -0.0593* 0.0356
2.north west -0.0026*** 0.0003 -0.1043*** 0.0272 -0.1009*** 0.0302
3.south east 0.0003 0.0003 0.1548*** 0.0314 0.1507*** 0.0348
4.south south 0.0009*** 0.0003 0.1800*** 0.0314 0.1988*** 0.0349
5.south west -0.0002 0.0004 0.0901** 0.0393 0.1117** 0.0438
household size 0.0000 0.0000 0.0064* 0.0035 0.0056 0.0039
eta 1.0000*** 0.0068 1.0000*** 0.0083 1.0000*** 0.0087
cons 0.1693*** 0.0005 -0.1399*** 0.0507 -0.1129** 0.0565
No. Of obs. 25,892 26,178 25,547
Inference: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05; and ∗p < 0.1.
Appendix 3: Income and health inequality from model (2.11)
ADL Total health exp. OOP health exp.
Variable Coeff. Std Err. Coeff. Std Err. Coeff. Std Err.
income rank 0.0004 0.0003 0.0161 0.0324 0.0134 0.0362
1.wave 0.0019*** 0.0002 0.0293* 0.0177 0.0281 0.0197
age -0.0001*** 0.0000 0.00745*** 0.0024 0.0013 0.0027
age−squared 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001* 0.0000
Gender
1.male 0.0015*** 0.0002 0.0738*** 0.0177 0.1126*** 0.0197
Level of education
1.secondary -0.0006** 0.0003 -0.1650*** 0.0266 -0.1718*** 0.0297
2.professional/diploma -0.0006 0.0005 -0.2003*** 0.0485 -0.2566*** 0.0542
3.at least degree -0.0007 0.0005 -0.3687*** 0.0530 -0.2694*** 0.0588
Marital status
1.married 0.0050*** 0.0003 0.0804** 0.0339 0.1423*** 0.0378
2.divorced/widowed/sep. -0.0027*** 0.0005 0.0312 0.0565 0.0859 0.0630
Place of residence
1.urban 0.0001 0.0002 0.0641*** 0.0209 0.0782*** 0.0233
Zone of residence
1.north east -0.0024*** 0.0003 -0.0567* 0.0315 -0.0587* 0.0356
2.north west -0.0026*** 0.0003 -0.1033*** 0.0273 -0.1004*** 0.0302
3.south east 0.0003 0.0003 0.1511*** 0.0317 0.1488*** 0.0351
4.south south 0.0009*** 0.0003 0.1748*** 0.0319 0.1961*** 0.0355
5.south west -0.0003 0.0004 0.0890** 0.0396 0.1096** 0.0441
household size 0.0000 0.0000 0.0064* 0.0035 0.0056 0.0039
eta 1.0000*** 0.0068 1.0000*** 0.0083 1.0000*** 0.0087
cons 0.1697*** 0.0005 -0.1574*** 0.0503 -0.1181** 0.0561
No. Of obs. 25,892 26,178 25,547
Inference: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05; and ∗p < 0.1.
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